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‘L’État c’est moi’....ou quoi? On the interrelations of accounting, managing and governing in 
the French ‘administrative monarchy’: revisiting the Colbert (1661-1683) and Paris brothers 
(1712-1726) episodes. 
 
Abstract 
 
We explore the genesis of the modern power of management and accounting, reviewing two 
historical episodes that have been claimed to embody aspects of this modernity. For our 
analysis, we distinguish two aspects of double-entry bookkeeping (DEB): first, the basic 
bookkeeping technique of cross-referencing and analysing doubled entries (Sangster 2016), 
and second ‘the full logic’ of a closed system tracking an entity’s income and expense, assets 
and liabilities, and ‘capital’ (Mattessich 2000). Our first episode is Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s 
‘governing by inquiry’ (1661-1683), understood as a ‘managing’ of the French 
‘administrative state’ under Louis XIV, where we see DEB’s use as limited to the first 
technique, undertaken for a forensic auditing of tax revenues to control and amend bad 
conduct. Second is the episode (1712-1726) of a banking family, the Paris brothers, where 
DEB is again first deployed similarly, for auditing and control of tax farmer practice, but then 
proposed as more general means of managing/governing the state. We review the 
interpretations of the first of these episodes made by Miller (1990) and Soll (2009, 2014), and 
that of Lemarchand (1999) concerning the second. We draw on Foucault’s analysis of today’s 
forms of governing as a ‘governmental management’ (2007, 107-108), which was blocked in 
the era of the administrative state, and explain this blockage as a result of principal-agent 
structures being used to govern the state. In this light, we see Miller as over-interpreting the 
closeness of Colbert’s ‘governing by inquiry’ to modern ‘governmentality’, and Soll as over- 
interpreting modern forms of management and accounting as operative in the governing 
approach of Colbert as ‘Information Master’. We also re-analyse the effective reach of the 
ambitions of the Paris brothers, as set out by Lemarchand, for the deployment of DEB. We 
then draw on Foucault’s (2001) and Panofsky’s (1957) analyses of ‘inquiry’ as a ‘form of 
truth’ which began as a new twelfth-century way of thinking, and trace this to Abelard’s 
development of ‘inquisitio’ as a new ‘critical reading’ (cf. Hoskin and Macve 1986). We 
characterise its modus operandi as a ‘graphocentric synopticism’, graphocentric since all 
‘data’ are translated into a gridded, cross-referenced über-text, which is then readable 
synoptically, all-in-one, from an immobile synthesising position. Foucault (2001) suggests 
that ‘inquiry’ gives way as mode of truth to ‘examination’ around 1800, and we link the 
genesis of governmental management to this shift and to the consequent articulation of a 
‘panopticism’ which is multiply semiotic and so ‘grammatocentric’.  
 
 
Keywords: Colbert; Paris brothers; double-entry bookkeeping (DEB); administrative 
monarchy; graphocentric panopticism; modern management; governmentality 
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‘L’État c’est moi’....ou quoi? On the interrelations of accounting, managing and governing in 
the French ‘administrative monarchy’: revisiting the Colbert (1661-1683) and Paris brothers 
(1712-1726) episodes. 
 
Introduction. On the interrelations of accounting, managing and governing the state: 
before and after the development of Foucault’s ‘governmental management’  
 
This study has both a historical and theoretical concern. In seeking to understand at the 
wider level the genesis of the power of modern management and accounting, we revisit here a 
historical issue that has gained in theoretical or conceptual significance in recent decades (not 
least through a now-widespread interest in what Michel Foucault, perhaps unfortunately, 
named ‘governmentality’): the issue of how ‘governing’ takes place in different eras. In what 
ways for instance are there continuities, and in what ways are there, at certain times and in 
certain places, ruptures in ways or even ‘arts’ of governing? And insofar as there are perhaps 
such ruptures, when and where are they located? In what do they consist? And how do they 
come about?  
To narrow down that wide set of concerns, we focus here on the issue of how the 
governing of the state took place in the era of what has increasingly become called the 
‘administrative monarchy’ or ‘administrative state’, even where that state had a seemingly 
‘absolute’ sovereign, as famously, if apocryphally, captured in that phrase attributed to Louis 
XIV, ‘L’État c’est moi.’1 If we marginally prefer the term ‘administrative state’, it is largely 
because non-monarchical states such as the Dutch also adopted ‘administrative’ practices of 
governing. Foucault uses both terms, but uses the more generic one in his own initial 
discussion of how the study of ‘governmentality’ must in part address the historical genesis 
of the modern form of governing, saying: ‘Finally by “governmentality” we should 
understand the process, or rather the result of the process, by which the state of justice of the 
Middle Ages, having become the administrative state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, 
was gradually “governmentalized”’ (Foucault 2007, 109, emphasis added).  
More narrowly still, we focus on two ‘episodes’ where accounting, and in particular 
double-entry bookkeeping (hereafter DEB), has been identified as having played a significant 
                                                 
1 Concerning the phrase, Collins (2009, xxiv) has noted: ‘Sixty years after the German historian Fritz Hartung 
demonstrated (it).... to be apocryphal, we still cherish the remark’. Collins also has a thoughtful discussion on a 
linguistic shift among historians away from the terms ‘absolute’ and ‘absolutism’, which are increasingly seen 
as contentious and unhelpful in analysing the French state under and after Louis, towards the term 
‘administrative monarchy’ as an alternative that has increasingly been adopted. 
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role in enabling the ‘administrative’ French state to manage its finances. The first is Jean-
Baptiste Colbert’s ordering of the finances of Louis XIV (Miller 1990; Soll 2009, 2014). 
second is a similar attempt by the four Paris brothers for Louis XV (Lemarchand 1999; 
2014). Both episodes, we conclude, are significant in what they reveal concerning what 
accounting could and could not do at the level of governing the ‘administrative’ form of 
state, even where Colbert and the Paris brothers, as the main protagonists concerned with 
putting accounting to work, were highly skilled and experienced in using DEB.2  
In reviewing these episodes, we consider the interpretations of them made by the above 
scholars, which understandably vary since the authors begin from different theoretical 
and/or historiographical positions. We seek then to frame our own answer to the questions 
they raise from a position based on a re-reading of what Foucault has to say on 
‘governmentality’, and in particular his analysis, in the full set of his first series of lectures 
on this, Security, Territory, Population (Foucault 2007), on how from the sixteenth 
century there was ‘the breakthrough of a “governmental reason”…an absolutely specific 
art of government…with its own reason,….an event in the history of Western reason…no 
less important than the event associated with Kepler, Galileo, Descartes and so on’ (2007, 
285-286).  
One observation that we pick up is Foucault’s argument that ‘this art of government 
could not acquire its full scope and consistency before the eighteenth century; it remained 
imprisoned, as it were, within the forms of the administrative monarchy’ (2007, 101). 
Building on this, he goes on to argue that the new governmental reason only emerges in a 
fully-fledged form, so to speak, in the form of a new mode of governing which he names 
as ‘governmental management’.  
This term needs differentiating from the more generic and widely-known term, 
‘governmentality’.  Indeed it needs highlighting in its own right since it has been largely if 
not completely invisible in previously English versions of the lecture where Foucault first 
introduces both terms, which is the fourth lecture of Security, Territory, Population, a 
lecture originally published in English in standalone form (Foucault 1979, 1991).  
                                                 
2 Colbert grew up in a merchant banking family from Reims. As Soll notes (2009, 34-36) he learned the family 
trade, including an initial exposure to DEB, before going on to an apprenticeship with the Lyon office of family 
associates, the Mascranni (an Italian banking family), and then to ‘a clerkship at the Parisian accounting house, 
l’étude Chappelain’ (2009, 34-35). Concerning the four Paris brothers (Antoine, Claude, Joseph, and Jean 
Paris), Lemarchand explains that they ‘were among the most famous financiers of the period’ and that their 
approach was to ‘introduce new accounting procedures’ in order to address two central and linked problems in 
state tax collection, ‘to speed up the receipts of the Treasury and to decrease interest costs’ (1999, 226). 
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In both versions—one of which, that published as ‘Governmentality’ in The Foucault 
Effect (Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991), is probably the most widely-read version of the 
the lecture in English or French—the term is rendered as ‘government’, so the naming of 
management here by Foucault is invisible. Even in Graham Burchell’s generally excellent 
translation of the full lecture series, the term ‘governmental management’ is translated only 
only once, where in the French, Foucault uses it twice, so that the full sense of what Foucault 
Foucault says is muted. However, once the original French is restored, what he says is that 
we should understand the modern art of governing as a triangle, of ‘sovereignty, discipline 
and governmental management’: and he then goes on, ‘a governmental management which 
has population as its target and apparatuses (dispositifs) of security as its essential 
mechanisms’ (Foucault 2007, 107-108).3  
That distinction made, the full sense of the more generic term ‘governmentality’ may be 
properly appreciated. Foucault introduces it, for the first time in his lecture series (something 
not usually appreciated), in the paragraph immediately following the naming of governmental 
management (Foucault 2007, 108): and he then says that by it he means ‘three things’. First it 
designates the ensemble of factors ‘that allow the exercise’ of this ‘very specific, albeit very 
complex, power’ which has ‘population as its target, political economy as its major form of 
knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument’: that is, the 
ensemble he has just named as ‘governmental management’.  
But the other two meanings have a quite different scope and focus (although they are 
interrelated). The second refers to the ‘line of force’ that ‘has constantly led towards the pre-
eminence….of the type of power that we can call “government”’; and the third refers to the 
historical process, already cited above, ‘by which the state of justice of the Middle Ages, 
having become the administrative state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, was gradually 
“governmentalized”’ (2007, 109). 
We are particularly concerned here with these latter two intertwined meanings of 
‘governmentality’.  For, in our view, to trace the history of ‘governmentalising’ under the 
administrative state is also potentially to open up the precise dynamic of the ‘line of force’ he 
cites, insofar as that is this new ‘governmental reason’, understood as this ‘absolutely specific 
new art of government…with its own reason’ first emerging in the age of Kepler, Galileo and 
Descartes. For even if the full unfolding of this reason/line of force is blocked in the era of 
                                                 
3 The repetition of the term indicates that it is governmental management as such, not the triangle as a whole, 
which has these transformative effects. For a full analysis of these translation (mis)adventures, see Hoskin 
(forthcoming 2017). 
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the administrative state, that era is where Foucault claims to see it beginning. Therefore to 
analyse the interplays of managing and accounting in what he claims is that first form of 
new art of governing is potentially of value to understanding first, what constitutes this 
proposed blockage; second, how it may be understood as being resolved; and third, what 
constitutes the new governmental management form of ‘governmentality’.  
This is the project which we seek to make a start on in this study. At one level, it is 
important, we think, as a preliminary step to clarify just how Foucault names a particular 
form of management as constituting the modern version of this new ‘reason’, when the 
presence of management within ‘the governmental’ has been so relatively invisible, to the 
Anglophone readership at least, until now. That having been said, the more significant 
issue here is whether, and if so how, forms of governing before this putative shift do 
utilise forms of managing and accounting as features of a ‘governmental reason’.  
Here we suggest that a focus on France and the developments under Louis XIV, and 
particularly on the episodes which we investigate here, may have a particular pertinence 
since the name that Foucault suggests for the kind of reasoned government of the 
administrative state is ‘raison d’État’, which, it should be noted, he approaches very much 
as a form of reason rather than a rationalised cover for the exercise of power. But its 
particular pertinence perhaps derives from what he then goes on to suggest: namely that 
the articulation of ‘raison d’État’ as a form of reason within the French state context is 
particularly significant, since: ‘It is precisely Louis XIV who introduces the specificity of 
raison d’État into the general forms of sovereignty’ (Foucault 2007, 246).   
So our episodes potentially provide the opportunity to explore or test what may be 
involved in a reasoned governing of the administrative state under the principle of ‘raison 
d’État’, and in particular how this may entail operating with forms of ‘managing’ which 
incorporate forms of accounting. At the same time, they afford the opportunity to test how 
far these interplays of managing and accounting differ from those that may be discerned as 
developing as manifestations of the ‘governmental management’ which Foucault sees as 
ensuing only from around 1800; or indeed how far they act as challenges to or limitations 
upon that new version of ‘governmental reason’. For there is no warrant for assuming that 
either ‘governmental reason’ in general or ‘governmental management’ specifically have a 
‘free pass’ where they exercise a right to govern without challenge: particularly nowadays 
in a world where government has to recognise the demands of ‘the economy’ or of 
‘economic truth’, and where the art of government is frequently exercised through or on 
behalf of transnational corporate business entities.  
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We suggest that this investigation may, therefore, be of value going forward, in seeking to 
understand what may be distinctive and different both in contemporary modes of governing 
the state (and their relations with ‘the economic’), and in our modes of managing the business 
enterprise (and their relations with the state, or series of states). We may even, perhaps, open 
up new ways of analysing or understanding the interplay between these supposedly different 
activities, in which it may be possible to discern new and significant conceptual alignments 
between them, insofar as both may be different manifestations of the second form taken by 
this new ‘governmental reason’: by which we wish to suggest that forms of ‘governmental 
management’ may now have as their reciprocal forms those of ‘managemental government’.  
In particular, we suggest that it may be possible to make new or different connections here 
through analysing more closely a connection that Foucault makes between ‘governmental 
management’ as the means to governing what he designates as that new object of 
government, the ‘population’, and the limitations put on governing the state by the 
constitution of a new form of the market, where it becomes both ‘a site and a mechanism of 
the formation of truth’, as he puts it in The Birth of Biopolitics, his second set of lectures on 
governmentality (Foucault 2008, 30).4   
So our opening reflection is this: through reading Foucault closely, much of what is taken 
as constituting modern ‘governmental reason’ and ‘economic truth’ comes under question, 
perhaps even becomes less stable conceptually. But one key reason is that such a close 
reading of his texts, as above, finds management and accounting becoming visible as central 
terms that he invokes in unexpected and discomfiting ways (previously largely invisible) as 
‘drivers’ of new ways of engaging with ‘the economic’ and ‘the governmental’ which are 
often largely our ways still.  
Therefore we seek here to read him equally closely for what he has to say concerning the 
exercise both of ‘governmental reason’ and of what constitutes ‘economic truth’ before the 
advent of these modern forms, and particularly in the immediately prior era which he 
designates as that of ‘the administrative state’. What remains to be seen is whether, and if so 
how far, management and accounting may play significant roles in this prior era, and if so in 
what those roles consist. That is our particular historiographical agenda here. At the same 
time, we leave open the possibility that pursuing that agenda may open up some comparable 
                                                 
4 Again, see Hoskin (forthcoming 2017), for a close reading of the ways in which Foucault, particularly in the 
first four lectures of Security, Territory, Population, names accounting—in the form of a conceptually new 
concern with ‘cost’—as what constructs this new ‘economic truth’ that then limits the scope of governmental 
reason. That argument is then pursued more extensively in the next year’s lectures, The Birth of Biopolitics 
(Foucault 2008, especially pages 30-32, and ff.).  
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forms of questioning concerning how we might understand the scope and the limits of 
management, accounting, and the state in eras other than our own.  
We proceed as follows. In the next section, we provide an overview of our two central 
episodes and of the putative roles of DEB in governing the administrative state. We raise 
the possibility that one reason why managing may, as Foucault suggests, have been 
‘imprisoned…within the forms of the administrative monarchy’ was because of the 
fundamentally ‘principal-agent’ structures through which the art of governing was 
conducted: rather than co-ordinating or linking lines of command and activities and 
policies, sovereigns tended to deal with different ministers discretely, in a form of ‘divide-
and rule’. Similarly ministers had their discrete teams of close advisers and functionaries 
who reported solely to their minister. Certainly Colbert made great and effective use of the 
form of governing described as ‘governing by inquiry’. But he did so within this kind of 
principal-agent structure, which indeed he exploited in many respects to secure priority 
access to the King.  
In the two subsequent sections, we first set out and contrast Miller’s (1990) and Soll’s 
(2009, 2014) analyses of the form and practice of Colbert’s governing of the state, before 
drawing out some of the implications of Foucault’s way of theorising and periodising 
modes of governing, as developed in the now-available lecture series (Foucault 2007).  
There then follows a section where we look further into the background history of the 
mode of establishing knowledge through ‘inquiry’ (or ‘enquête’) and propose that in its 
various forms it is developed from the twelfth century and articulates a principle for 
establishing truth which we may characterise as a ‘graphocentric synopticism’, a principle 
upon which Colbert and the Paris brothers draw systematically in seeking to manage and 
reform the tax collection practices of the state.5 We then revisit the two French episodes in 
the light of these theoretical and historical insights, (including an additional close reading 
of Colbert’s 1663 ‘Mémoires sur les affaires des finances de France’ in the Appendix).  
In our penultimate section, we suggest that the graphocentric synopticism of ‘inquiry’ 
precedes and shapes a subsequent truth-principle, which Foucault identifies as 
‘panopticism’ but which we shall suggest might better now be specified as a 
‘grammatocentric panopticism’ (Hoskin and Macve 1993). Here we would just note that 
Foucault himself proposes that ‘panopticism is a form of power than rests not on the 
                                                 
5 Equivalently the principle may be described as ‘synoptic graphocentrism’. 
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inquiry but on…the “examination”’ (2001, 58).6 We would agree, but would now ask 
whether Bentham’s panopticon is not rather a synopticon therefore, in that one viewer from 
from one overview location is set up to see the ‘truth of things’. Meanwhile our modern 
‘panoptic’ world is one which sets up multiple overview locations with multiple viewers, who 
who then engage in the multiply visual and examinatorial mutual surveillance of ‘one and all’ 
by ‘one and all’ that defines our modern life (e.g. Ezzamel, Hoskin, and Macve 1990). A final 
brief section concludes.  
 
Accounting meets the governing of the administrative state: two episodes 
 
The first of our episodes takes place during the reign of Louis XIV (1643-1715) but begins 
while Louis is still only in his twenties, where it constitutes a specific episode in the so-called 
‘Colbert period’ (1661-1683), which has been widely recognised as a particularly ‘advanced’ 
or sophisticated version of the art of government as practised within the administrative state 
(e.g. Dessert 1984, 2007; Miller 1990; Soll 2009, 2014). The second begins in the very last 
years of Louis’s reign, with a first phase beginning in 1712 and its second phase taking place 
in the early years of his grandson and successor Louis XV (1715-1774), ending in 1726. Here 
the protagonists acting on behalf of the Crown are the four Paris brothers. In the first phase 
only one brother, Antoine de Paris, is involved; subsequently all are.  
These different episodes, when located in the wider frame of how the art of governing was 
exercised in the era of the administrative state, reveal some significant regularities in how 
both ‘accounting’ and certain forms of ‘managing’ came into play. For both are moments 
where accounting in the form of DEB has been understood as directly involved in an attempt 
to introduce a closer management of a central aspect of governing the state, the collection of 
tax revenues (Soll 2009, 2014), and potentially more fundamentally the co-ordination and 
control of state finances (Lemarchand 1999).  
As ‘DEB’ can be loosely used to describe a range of bookkeeping techniques that took 
several centuries to evolve (cf. Lemarchand 1994), we need to be clear how we (and the 
authors we review) are using it here. At one level, one may focus on how the disciplines of 
‘debit and credit’ had developed to create an integrated system of interlocking, fully cross-
referenced, visually balanced accounts that can bring order to a business owner’s affairs, not 
                                                 
6 All this implies some significant reformulation of the argument developed in Hoskin and Macve (1986) that 
the forms of accounting developed in the West from the thirteenth century on constitute an interplay between 
accounting and the examination: up to 1800, the significant interplay of accounting is perhaps with the inquiry. 
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least by assisting cross-checking for errors and discrepancies in the books.7 Sangster 
(2016) sees the emergence of such a system and its role in tracking banks’ debtors as the 
defining characteristic of DEB; but it must also be recognised that the development of 
such interlinked ordering and layout of books is linked to earlier shifts in textual layout, 
just as this particular early use is part of a more general dissemination of DEB in Italy for 
the allocation and management of resources in the household (e.g. Hoskin and Macve 
1986; Goldthwaite 2015). 
However, historical, economic and social significance has more often been attributed to 
a second aspect of DEB: not its particular techniques of writing the books, but the way in 
which this integrated system is ‘closed’ and so (apparently) tracks panoptically (or at least, 
synoptically) the owner’s economic ‘capital’ and ‘income’ (e.g. Mattessich 2000, 
Introduction, 13). As we shall argue further below, it is not the complete integration of the 
books to be found in business accounts that shows up as a practice of governing in the 
administrative state, but only the first aspect of DEB, and primarily only the first stages of 
that aspect—namely the tracking of transactions in a disciplined and cross-referenced form 
through the chronological day-books (or ‘Journals’) and the maintaining of accounts of 
debts owed (e.g. Sangster 2016).  
This, we shall argue, was the practice that both Colbert and the Paris brothers were able 
to exploit: but it was also, given the principal-agent structures within which they put 
accounting to governmental use, a practice which their opponents were able to undo 
relatively easily after they were gone.8 When we refer, therefore, to ‘DEB’ in this study, 
we will typically be referring to its use in this more limited bookkeeping sense, and we 
will refer to ‘the full logic of DEB’ only when referring to the integrated economic 
synthesis on which Mattessich focuses (cf. Hoskin, Ma, and Macve 2016a, 2016b). 
So our argument here will be that DEB is involved, but in both episodes, it is used only 
in a restricted role, to inform (in the case of Colbert) and to enact (in that of the Paris 
brothers) the exercise of control over the actions of recalcitrant or reluctant tax officials of 
different kinds, a control effected through deploying the forensic skills involved in 
                                                 
7 Pacioli in 1494, in advocating DEB, emphasised the well-known maxim: ‘Ubi non est ordo ibi est confusio’ 
[‘where there is no order there is confusion’] (von Gebsattel 1994). Miller (1990) develops this theme. 
8 It is apparent that management, whether at the private family/business level or at the level of the state, can be 
achieved (and has been achieved at different times and different places throughout history) by other forms of 
accounting, whence the claims made for DEB’s value have long been debatable (e.g. Yamey 1949; Macve 2015; 
Hoskin, Ma, and Macve 2016a).We may note that the UK government has only recently adopted DEB in order 
to implement the ‘accruals accounting’ that was perceived to be essential to a program of ‘New Public 
Management’ (e.g. Broadbent and Guthrie 1992; Hood 1995). 
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analysing DEB accounts to identify bad debts and then acting appropriately to resolve them.9  
Both Colbert and the Paris brothers can do this since, as noted, they have total familiarity 
with DEB from their youth (Soll 2014; Lemarchand 1999). Thus they know already how to 
draw upon the system’s facility for the formal and systematic entering and tracking of all 
revenues and expenses, and upon the system of cross-referencing between their sources and 
destinations, in order then to exercise control over those parties shown up as recalcitrant or 
reluctant. Both then seek to accelerate the extraction of payments due from, or of funds 
secreted by, those ‘officials’ who are identified through the forensic process as responsible 
for the remittance—and for delaying the remittance—of the relevant monies.  
In the first episode, which dates to the early 1660s, Colbert does this by working with 
traditional royal stewardship accounts, which appear to be in charge-discharge format but are 
definitely not in double-entry (cf. Soll 2014).10 He draws upon his knowledge of DEB to 
attempt to re-shape the actions of state tax collecting agents by a forensic type of audit of the 
entries in the interlocking set of tax registers; more specifically he cross-checks for 
anomalies, omissions, or contradictions in those registers and seeks to eradicate them where 
found, thus increasing the speed and level of revenues coming to the Crown (cf. Soll 2009, 
58-64, ‘Royal Accountability’).  
In the second episode, studied by Yannick Lemarchand (Lemarchand 1999; cf. Soll 2014, 
133-134), the Paris brothers become involved, over the period 1712 to 1726, in what turns out 
to be a two-phase intervention into governing the state, where again the objective is to reform 
the tax raising system, and where again, in both phases, DEB is put to use in seeking to re-
shape the actions of the tax collecting agents of the state.  
In the first phase, Antoine de Paris is appointed to run the tax gathering system in the 
Dauphiné, where he does actually render existing stewardship accounts into double-entry 
format. He then uses the forensic techniques of DEB in a similar way to Colbert, to cross-
check in the local tax registers, identify lateness and inaccuracy in the delivery of tax receipts 
by local tax agents, and then impose a strict compliance with delivery on time of correct 
receipts.  
                                                 
9 When we use the term ‘official’ we do not mean by that term to suggest that these are salaried ‘officials’ in a 
modern form of tax bureaucracy or finance ministry. They are typically either members of the small group of 
officers of the Crown who manage the Royal Treasury or estates (Colbert’s main target), or those who have won 
contracts under some form of tax farming system to act as the agents who extract and remit the types of tax 
payments specified under the particular contract.  
10 While Soll emphasises how ‘Louis integrated accounting into statecraft’, and describes Colbert’s attempts to 
teach Louis DEB (and indeed appears to claim at one point that ‘the king used it in daily royal administration’), 
ultimately he only claims that Louis was familiar with accounts in ‘complex single-entry form’ (2014, 94-95).  
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In the second phase, all four brothers are tasked by the state’s Finance Minister, the 
Duc de Noailles, with seeking to remake the management and/or control of tax levying at 
the level of the central state. From 1716, they again seek to use DEB as a control and audit 
device through which they can exert a form of ‘managing’ the performance of the 
financiers who raise and remit the taxes in each tax jurisdiction. Then from 1720, they are 
tasked with extending this form of what we might call ‘management via DEB’ to 
controlling the state finances generally; at the same time they seek to align this approach, 
so Lemarchand (1999) argues, with a more general administrative reform of the structure 
of governing, which would have replaced ‘a set of decentralized contractual relations with 
a centralized bureaucratic administration’, thus constituting, he suggests, an early example 
of the emergence of Foucauldian ‘disciplinary technologies’ (1999, 225).  
But at this general state level the approach fails; they are not able to construct a 
centralised administration, and the resistance of the tax gatherers, drawing on allies 
involved in running other ‘fiefdoms’ within the governing of the state, brings the 
experiment to an end by 1726.11 
So in these two episodes, while there are elements of DEB bookkeeping to ensure the 
timely management of cash flows, they are not deployed (so far as the record shows) to 
fulfil the formal function of the ‘full logic of merchant DEB’, that is, to consolidate all an 
entity’s revenues and expenses, plus its assets and liabilities, so as to track its ‘capital’ 
(and thereby try to ensure the entity’s maintenance and putative success from the past into 
the future) (e.g. Mattessich 2000).  
As intimated above, we see a structural reason for this. For even where administrative 
monarchies might have one key administrator such as Colbert, that administrator operated 
in an overall ‘principal-agent’ structure, where the sovereign as ‘principal’ had a range of 
agents each with their own discrete sphere of influence. Then within a given discrete 
sphere, the given agent acted in turn as principal to a further set of agents answerable only 
to that direct principal. This was arguably a rational ‘divide and rule’ tactic by sovereigns 
in courts riven by rivalries, plots and counter-plots; but in any event it was the structure 
that generally obtained and one that worked perfectly well, within its terms and 
constraints, with the principles and practice of ‘charge-and-discharge’ accounting (cf. 
Lemarchand 1994).  
                                                 
11 One interesting implication of the second episode is the fact that it demonstrates the same problem recurring 
as that acted upon by Colbert: in other words by the early 1700s, the tax collection system had apparently re-
established a successful resistance to change. That resistance manifestly was able to triumph at the whole-state 
level once again, despite the local success in the Dauphiné. 
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Indeed Colbert can be seen as operating precisely in line with its tenets. On the one hand, 
he had his personal set of agents, principally his intendants, who answered only to him, thus 
operating his own principal-agent system; and on the other, he deployed plot and counter-plot 
effectively. First he made his way to becoming principal advisor to the King in 1661, as he 
successfully exposed the self-enrichment plans of his predecessor, Fouquet; and then he 
succeeded in retaining that position until his unexpected death in 1683, not least through 
making himself, as Soll (2009) so appositely puts it, the ‘Information Master’.  
Our argument then, with regard to DEB, is that both Colbert and the Paris brothers—
having all been trained in the analytical techniques of DEB from childhood—put these to 
work as best as possible within the existing structures of government. The techniques they 
used were well established in their own right—for instance a focus on tracking bad debts is 
clearly visible in the way that banking families such as the Medici had used their DEB 
accounts from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (de Roover 1956). But they make 
particular sense as a form of exercising financial control in a governmental structure where 
the state was in effect run as a series of fiefdoms, with the sovereign as sole ‘principal’ in 
charge of each and all: and they do so in a way that a systematic use of the fully integrated 
logic of DEB would not, given the lack of any centripetal and coherent ‘organisational base’ 
upon which to construct a set of interconnected and co-ordinated books of entry which might 
formally ‘tell the truth’ concerning the incomings and outgoings of the state’s resources in a 
focused and yet comprehensive way.  
We shall return to these episodes later. First we want to pursue the issue of the structure of 
governing and the extent to which it is a ‘principal-agent’ structure, and if so what the form 
of such principal-agent relations is. We thereby introduce a more general level of analysing 
the interrelations of accounting, managing and governing the state in the era of Colbert and 
the Paris brothers; and pay particular attention to two different but significant analyses, those 
of Miller (1990) and Soll (2009, 2014). 
 
On analysing the interrelations of accounting, managing and governing the state  
 
Even though we now know that the attribution of the phrase ‘L’État c’est moi’ to Louis 
XIV is apocryphal, nevertheless we have retained it in our title, to signal one aspect of 
considering the major issue that we see as retaining conceptual importance.  
This concerns just what form of sovereignty the exercise of rule in the ‘administrative’ 
state took. In other words, if we move beyond an acceptance of the state as ruled by a 
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somehow all-powerful sovereign, what still remains as a live issue is the question of just 
how governing was executed in and around the sovereign’s court and how far in such 
exercise one individual may have had a monopoly on the exercise of power. It is here that 
the Colbert period has exercised such fascination at the level of ‘governmental practices’, 
including accounting, because he can be seen to have taken certain existing forms of 
governing to a level of intensity that enabled him to gain control, either with or for Louis, 
of almost all the key aspects of the central governing of the state.  
The Colbert period begins following the death in March 1661 of Louis’s former Prime 
Minister Cardinal Mazarin (when Louis was 22): at which point Colbert becomes—or 
ensures that he becomes—the leading minister serving but also guiding the still-young 
king, a status secured formally when he obtains by 1665 the position of Louis’s Minister 
of Finance. One issue here is how far he is more than this. For Lemarchand (1999, 247, n. 
15), ‘from 1665, under the title of Contrôleur général des finances, he became a kind of 
super prime minister’. For Dessert (2007), meanwhile, if there is one ‘moi’ who could 
claim to be ‘l’État’, then the answer is quite clear: it was ‘Le Royaume de monsieur 
Colbert, 1661-1683’.12 
In any event, Colbert holds some form of ‘primus inter pares’ position until his own 
unexpected death in September 1683. Even if never given Mazarin’s Prime Ministerial 
title (Louis apparently vowed not to bestow it again), he is generally accepted to have had 
a level of access to, and influence upon, the sovereign that was not to be the case again. 
Indeed it is clear that Louis was resolved that it very much should not be, as he quickly 
dismantled the ‘advanced’ system of governing that Colbert had operated on his behalf 
(Soll 2009, 154-159), despite the advantages and successes that it, or Colbert, had secured 
for the Crown, not least in terms of restoring its revenues and rights from a position of 
considerable deficit in both.  
Even if one does not wholly accede to the Dessert view, one reason that this question 
can continue to have a certain legitimacy has everything to do, we shall argue, with the 
distinctive form of governing developed by Colbert—often known as ‘governing by 
inquiry’ or ‘enquête’ (e.g. Miller 1990, 327-329; Soll 2009, 67-83). As Miller puts it, this 
was both ‘an ideal programme of government founded on a desire to exert intellectual 
mastery over the minutiae of daily life in the provinces’ (1990, 327), and, at the same 
                                                 
12 Clearly there is no definitive answer: to those of Dessert and Lemarchand we may add Soll’s (2009, 51): 
‘Colbert did not make final policy, and he had to share power with the foreign minister, Hugues de Lionne, and 
the minister of war, Le Tellier. He was, nonetheless, the leading minister during the first two decades—arguably 
the most glorious—of Louis’s reign.’ 
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time, ‘as an ideal programme it accorded significances and roles to a wide range of 
techniques of inscription, recording and calculation… (including) orderly and standardized 
tables, memoirs, registers and periodic accounts’ (1990, 329).   
Soll additionally stresses the role of the central archive that Colbert established in his 
Library, where ‘(u)pstairs in finely bound double-book [sic] accounts, he kept his internal 
government reports, administrative correspondence, state statistical reports and the 
information of industry and administration’ (2009, 2). All of this documentation—along with 
whole streams of other official and historical documents that Colbert constantly demanded—
was generated, from across the kingdom and beyond, by Colbert’s agents in the field, 
principally the intendants who governed particular regions, and were now given a redefined 
and expanded role by Colbert, namely of information gathering to meet the requirements of 
his archive/Library.13  
This was a first crucial aspect of the Colbert system. Yet the generation of all this 
information only came to constitute the Colbertian art of government through what then 
ensued, particularly the skilled collecting, collating, and meticulous cross-referencing, on a 
continuously updated basis, of all the documents flowing into the Library. The art of 
governing was consummated when this flow of information (no doubt including some levels 
of mis- and dis-information as well) reached Colbert himself, where he then engaged, on any 
given topic of concern, what was clearly an extensive and intensive critical examination of all 
issues of concern to him, and then went on to re-write, into his own private considered 
opinions, all the relevant informational points in all the relevant texts. In this way, he sought 
to penetrate to the ‘core’ of any given issue and thereby have an understanding of where 
things stood in their ‘truth’, at a level and in a specificity beyond that available to anyone 
else.  
As Soll argues, this is a quite exceptional art of governing. It also constitutes, in a term 
that he uses extensively, a ‘managerial method’; furthermore as such it also entails a mastery 
not just of archiving but accounting, as evidenced for instance in the efforts that Colbert 
makes (sadly in vain, given Louis’s dismantling of the system on Colbert’s death) to train his 
son, ennobled as the Marquis of Seignelay, to take over the father’s role. As Soll puts it: 
‘Observation and note-taking were not enough. Seignelay needed the skills of an accountant 
and an archivist to handle the register books… . (He) would have to master the informational 
                                                 
13 One major purpose to which such documentation was put by Colbert was to establish, against the Church or 
local nobility, the rights of the king to estates, land or income streams. It was a major source of the 
transformation in the Royal finances that Colbert effected (Soll 2009, 67-70).  
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arcana of the state, data collection through industrial management and accounting, as well 
as archiving. It was this final task that Colbert considered essential, for keeping a well 
organized administrative archive and library were the basis of Colbert’s managerial 
method’ (Soll 2009, 93). 
It is here that the specific role of ‘enquête’ (‘inquiry’) is of particular interest. Colbert 
required, as Soll stresses, all reports to come to him in standard format, so that his officers 
and intendants all learned (through constant reminders) to write documents for Colbert in 
a tightly prescribed format, with clear protocols also concerning the need for careful 
checking of information submitted and a clear use of language. This therefore constituted 
a kind of totalising system of what Soll calls ‘information management’, which he argues 
goes well beyond prior practice.14 
This is something that Miller (1990) also picks up in his analysis of ‘governing by 
inquiry’, even while his approach and analytical concern differs significantly from those of 
Soll. His study is an early presentation of the sociological-historical form of analysis of 
‘governmentality’ developed during the 1980s (e.g. Miller and Rose 1990, 2008): and is 
particularly significant since this is an approach which has since proven perhaps the most 
influential variation of the more philosophical-historical analysis of governmentality 
developed initially by Foucault (e.g. 1991, 2007). One consequent concern that Miller’s 
approach investigates is how or how far this form of ‘governing by inquiry’ has 
interrelations with accounting, and how these ‘interrelations of accounting and the state’, 
as his title puts it, proceed beyond the direct practical financial and resourcing issues of 
governing to embrace a wider concern—which is very much part of Foucault’s own 
approach—with remaking ways of thinking and acting.  
Here Miller discerns a concern not restricted to Colbert, albeit shared by him, with the 
promotion of a particular rationale of ‘order’, through which he sees accounting and the 
state ‘to have been aligned, and roles for accounting articulated’ (1990, 315, Abstract), 
while a version of rational government could also be articulated. He analyses this art of 
government in terms of an interplay between ‘the programmatic and abstract field of 
                                                 
14 At the same time, the practice of enquête was not new in governing the state. Soll refers to medieval 
‘centralizing monarchs such as Philippe Auguste (1165-1233)’ using the practice in continuance of ‘the 
administrative traditions of the English in establishing inventories through inquisitiones or enquêtes which 
sought.....to register feudal and ecclesiastical rights and property while establishing royal authority and 
regulating abuses’ (2009, 67). He also refers to the subsequent and expanded form of enquête developed in the 
reign (1556-1598) of Philip II of Spain (Parker 1998), which extended the ‘relationship of high state policy to 
archival information-handling practices’ (Soll 2009, 9). So there was a past to the practice; but at the same time 
Colbert translates it into an art of governing without seeming precedent.  
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rationales, statements and claims…that is termed “political rationalities”… and the range of 
calculations, procedures and tools that materialize and visualize processes and activities, and 
that is termed “technologies”’ (1990, 315). Discursively he points to the significance for 
‘promoting order’ of Colbert’s commissioning of texts like Savary’s Le Parfait Négociant 
(which included principles of ‘book-keeping’) through seeking to re-make the thinking and 
acting of merchants to meet the principles of good governing that Colbert saw himself as 
standing for.15  
However, we would question aspects of each of these analyses. In the case of Miller’s 
analysis, despite a clear recognition on his part that what Foucault called ‘arts of government’ 
differ in different eras and that in consequence ‘accounting’ and ‘the state’ are not ‘two given 
and discrete entities’ but ‘emerged as distinct entities out of a variety of processes that 
constituted them qua discrete’ (1990, 316), the analysis sometimes appears, on our reading, 
as one that sees the Colbert case as an instance where aspects of modern governmentality 
were being anticipated, or where this exceptional case of governing in its era therefore has 
stronger than usual affinities to the present.  
Three aspects of accounting (as discourse and practice) are cited as contributing to this 
distinctive and almost-modern Colbert approach: ‘the formal requirements to keep books in 
certain specified ways, the emergence of pedagogic mechanisms for instructing merchants in 
the mechanics of accounting, and ways of representing the importance of accounting in terms 
of a discourse of “order”’ (1990, 322). These are then seen as being delivered through ‘a 
significant strengthening and elaborating of the role of the intendants as all-purpose local 
administrators, and the installation of more systematic and detailed information flows from 
the provinces to the centre, often through large-scale enquiries and with the intendants as 
active contributors’. This is also then seen as having led to ‘a strengthening of the centre to 
which this information flowed, a reinforcement of its role as a centre, and the provision of a 
firm basis for rendering the kingdom governable according to rational calculable principles’ 
(1990, 322, emphasis added).  
Rational calculability is a classic principle articulated in the ‘political rationales’ of 
modern forms of governmentality, and frequently instantiated through the technologies of 
accounting in their range of modern forms, often connected to a form of managing which puts 
accounting to use systematically to track financial and non-financial performance on an 
ongoing basis through forms of calculation, which involve forms both of DEB work and of 
                                                 
15 Soll also notes (2009, 57) that Savary’s text was commissioned by Colbert. 
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cost and management accounting.16 From these uses of accounting, and of other, 
calculation technologies can flow decisions made on such bases as cost, profit, cost versus 
benefit, alternative uses of scarce resources, Return on Investment and the like. So while it 
is assuredly definitely the case, as Miller observes earlier in his paper, that ‘“arts of 
government” and economic calculation are not easily separable’ (1990, 316), it is 
important to differentiate the precise forms taken by such economic calculation in 
different eras and how (and indeed how far) a given art of governing draws on such 
calculations in prosecuting the running of the state.  
Colbert is clearly an exceptional case in the era of ‘administrative monarchy’, with an 
exceptionality consisting in the degree of stress upon comprehensive information 
collection and upon reasoned and ordered analysis of that information in his version of 
governing by inquiry. Clearly too, he undertakes a systematic and extensive keeping and 
analysing of accounting information in so doing: not least the forensic audit of the entries 
in interlocking tax registers (which we shall discuss further when we return to our two 
‘episodes’ below). However, we shall also seek to remain systematically alert to ways in 
which these interrelations do not play out in the style of modern forms of managing via 
accounting (predicated on modern ‘rational calculable principles’).  
Our concern, therefore, is that Miller’s approach may elide significant differences in the 
interrelations it studies in its innovative attempt to trace the genesis or first stirrings of a 
modern form of governmentality. Some of the phrasing that his paper uses, and of the 
judgements that it renders on the ‘Colbert Case’ (1990, 322) seem to indicate this kind of 
tendency.  For instance the Case is characterised as ‘an early attempt to govern a nation by 
exerting a kind of intellectual mastery over it’, and so as ‘a programme of government that 
elevates a desire to know the nation and its subjects in fine detail’, and also as one which 
‘sought to identify the processes, characteristics and regularities of key aspects of 
economic and social life’ (1990, 322).  
However, it is not clear that in seeking to know so much about ‘the nation and its 
subjects’, Colbert did so in the later pattern of ‘governmental management’ (2007, 107), 
where the direct focus is on that ‘population’ of subjects, and where the desires and 
interests of both individuals and population are to be managed.17 For many, perhaps most, 
of his inquiries are focused not on the population as a whole but on key wealthy or 
                                                 
16 These would be increasingly integrated, for example, in nineteenth-century US/UK industrial practice (Hoskin 
and Macve 2000). 
17 As we further discuss later. 
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powerful targets (e.g. local nobility, or the Church), as he seeks to remove rights, privileges 
or income flows from these entities to the Crown. 
Turning to the Soll approach (2009, 2014), it differs significantly from the kind of highly 
theorised form of analysis of the Miller study, being both more historically detailed and more 
historiographically conventional. At the same time, Soll’s study is similar, as noted already, 
in its extensive consideration of the roles of inquiry (or enquête) and accounting in the 
governing of the state, and also since he too picks up on the ways in which Colbert did seek 
to promote, not least through a long-running support for Savary, a reshaping of merchant 
thought on the utility of accounting in managing one’s personal and business affairs (for the 
good of the state as well as of merchants). 
Here the interpretive problem that we have is one that is almost the opposite of what we 
see in Miller’s. For we see a tendency to propose a sense of historical or historiographical 
continuity in terminology between present and past, particularly in the presentation and use of 
the term ‘management’, which frequently becomes a term that can be applied non-
problematically to Colbert’s form of governing in ways similar to its use today. So for 
instance from the outset of the 2009 book we find passages where we get a non-contentious 
initial claim that Colbert’s approach was a form of managing but then an elision towards 
describing it as ‘micromanaging’.18  
Conventions and usages change, certainly, and perhaps this is or has become an 
unproblematic usage. But we also see a more general pattern whereby management becomes 
treated as a kind of transhistorical term—present in similar ways across time if with local or 
contextual variations—in Soll’s narrative. For instance the much earlier medieval 
development of the first great systems of cross-referencing and indexing texts—as 
increasingly revealed in a range of studies across recent decades (e.g. Rouse and Rouse, 
1979, 1982; Blair 2010, Grafton 1999)—is described as ‘archival and library management’ 
undertaken by ‘archival and library managers’.19  
                                                 
18 As for instance: Colbert ‘managed his multifaceted administration through his library, developing a system to 
use archives, state research institutes, internal reports and trained teams of specialists to develop high 
policymaking in areas of colonial expansion and diplomacy, as well as to micromanage industrial production 
and matters as mundane as the policing of intellectuals, book printers, prostitutes and the butcher’s guild’ (2009, 
3). 
19 So Soll first introduces Colbert’s general approach to governing, saying: ‘Fusing the cultures of archival and 
library management, the world of natural science, finance, merchant learning and industrial technology, he 
began asking questions basic to encyclopaedists and archival and library managers, as well as to Google 
information technicians today: how to compile, copy and store a mass of eclectic documents and render them 
searchable for topics’ (2009, 2-3). While one should perhaps note that ‘managing’ also appears in the title of 
Blair’s 2010 text on the medieval transformation, Rouse and Rouse, as perhaps the most significant pioneers in 
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In a similar way, Colbert is given the designation of both ‘accountant’ and ‘financial 
manager’ in Soll’s summary of his diverse attributes: ‘Studying with the Jesuits and as an 
accountant, and then working as a financial manager and military contractor, he saw the 
connection between these cultures and their usefulness for state administration’ (Soll 
2009, 5). Again a few pages later, Soll observes that ‘Colbert was an accountant, a 
merchant and industrial manager, a policeman and a master librarian’ (2009, 12). But here, 
we would argue, the slippage conceals a substantive difference, which becomes clear in 
the detail on Colbert’s industrial management practice given in Chapter 5 of the book (Soll 
2009, 67-83).  In this instance, Colbert’s managing takes for the most part one of two forms: either 
seeking information on current practice in various industrial or manufacturing settings, in 
a typical manifestation of enquête practice, or an issuing of exhortations or imperatives in 
a form of ‘managing at a distance’, either from Colbert himself or as delegated to his 
intendants, to those running such enterprises.  
We get a first good example of both (Soll 2009, 69) from Colbert’s 1663 ‘Instruction 
pour les maîtres des requêtes’, wherein he constructs a formulary telling his officials first 
what to collect, among other things, on ‘commerce and manufacturing’, and second what 
to enforce through (a) specific ‘orders concerning how they were to regulate law, taxes, 
industry and culture’ and (b) through following the King’s request ‘that they “carefully 
examine” each sovereign company “in general and in detail, and those who compose 
them”’. But this is the audit of resources and competences, not the direct managing of 
activity.20  
Again, ‘writers’ or ecrivains ‘were assigned to ships to manage them as small 
companies’ (2009, 75), as a result of which de Terron, an intendant, could report to 
Colbert: ‘The establishment of writers strongly contributes to keeping the captains in 
order’. But at the same time, he is asking Colbert to ‘let the captains know that the 
establishment of the writers is agreeable to the King and that His Majesty wants them to 
be able to carry out their duties to their full extent and with complete liberty’. So while 
                                                                                                                                                        
this field, do not apparently describe the initial emergence of the ‘artificial finding devices’ (1982, 202) that we 
still use today as ‘managing’. So again there may just be here a new discursive regularity.  
20 The same approach, though with a more direct accounting focus, is used where Colbert gets intendants, 
including his brother, Colbert de Croissy, when he was ‘ambassador to London’ (2009, 74), to gather data on 
shipbuilding, including actual amounts and costs of all raw materials for construction, e.g. wood and iron, plus 
for each material ‘the price according to that of the ordinary cost,’ plus ‘the number of days of all the workers 
and their price’ (sc. actual time and cost of labour), so as to calculate item by item ‘the cost of construction of 
the hull of the ship....and generally of all that which makes up a ship and places it in a state of readiness for the 
sea’.  
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this may be described as ‘management at a distance’, it is again at an audit type of level; it is 
not direct interventionist economic or ‘business’ management.21  
We read off exactly the same dynamic from the case of the man who had the most direct 
responsibility for industrial oversight, ‘the influential Inspector General of Manufactures, 
Francesco (or François) Bellinzani’ (2009, 76). As Soll puts it, Colbert writes that, in his 
visits to factories, Bellinzani ‘should “observe” if the company was useful, well run, and 
better than those in Flanders’ and then should be sure ‘to “verify” the number of different 
kinds of artisans, the number of male and female workers, and if the factories were following 
new state rules’. Soll then goes on: ‘Like a naturalist or an explorer, Colbert uses the terms 
“observe” and “examine”. His agent would have to compare “intelligence” with local royal 
officials to try to make these cloth factories work at a higher standard than Dutch 
competitors, as well as organize an entire distribution network’ (2009, 76).  
We see the analogies as apposite: but precisely because Colbert as naturalist or explorer is 
at that distance where ‘intelligence’ is designed to generate improvement purely through 
comparison. Hence our characterisation of his practice as an inquiry-based form of what one 
might call ‘managing at a distance’. In no respect is this a modern type of ‘industrial 
management’ entailing use of reports for day-to-day direct co-ordination and control of 
inputs, throughputs and outputs, or even a modern ‘top-management’ concern with the setting 
of budgets or managerial and workforce targets. Instead, as we read it, Colbert is pursuing 
with respect to industrial management an agenda and a practice which conforms completely 
to the principles of governing by inquiry.  
 
On ‘governing by inquiry’ as other than ‘governmental management’ 
Historiographically, our approach is to seek to evaluate this form of governing the state in 
the terms of its own era, where, as we have already intimated, even in actual manufactories of 
the era it is not clear that there is ‘industrial management’ of a modern form (cf. Lemarchand 
1994).22  
                                                 
21 We would note that Soll’s interpretation is that this is ‘virtual management’: ‘This then led to Colbert’s virtual 
management of sites such as Rochefort through correspondence with his intendant…’ (2009, 76). 
22 Again there seems typically to be a principal-agent type of set-up for workplace activity, in the shape either of 
inside contracting or putting out systems. This absence of hierarchical managerial relations dovetails with an 
absence, in the processes for the co-ordination of work, of any systematic use of cost tracking or control to 
promote efficiency or effectiveness in work production. Constructing such detailed ‘cost objects’ is different 
from exhibiting a concern through the accounts with economy at the level of inputs and with the possible misuse 
or stealing of workplace materials or tools (e.g. Hoskin and Macve 2000). 
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That being noted, we seek now to look at the fine detail of Colbert’s management 
practice in the conduct of ‘governing by inquiry’, with particular reference to his use of 
accounting as a form of what appears to be control of the conduct of agents rather than a 
systematic modern form of financial management. Here the evidence points towards 
pursuing a relatively circumscribed set of objectives in the use of ‘inquiry’: for instance to 
uncover the fine detail of the actions or circumstances of individuals such as tax officials 
who might be concealing, delaying or otherwise failing to deliver tax receipts due to the 
king, or landed gentry whose claim to noble titles could be proven through the archive to 
be false, thus delivering lands and their produce and rents to the Crown.  
This leads us to a more theoretical concern, insofar as we share with Miller in seeing 
the events which we interrogate here as shedding light on the emergence of modern 
governmentality—but see them rather differently. Put briefly, the events on which we 
focus here ‘make sense’, under Foucault’s own analysis (as now visible in Security, 
Territory, Population), only when put into a context where there is as yet not a modern 
form of ‘governmental management’. Colbert is running his own network of intendants 
with a meticulous micro-managing commitment, but that network is not nested within 
anything resembling the line-and-staff structures either of Chandler’s modern business 
enterprise or Weberian bureaucracy, each of which requires co-ordination across the 
functions and departments of governing or managing, whether the entity is the state or the 
modern business enterprise. There must be both centrally and in each department or unit 
within each ‘line’ a permanent staff function, so that the hierarchy of staff units mirrors 
that of the line units, thus enabling the consequent ‘hierarchy of middle and top salaried 
managers to monitor and control the work of the units under its control’ (Chandler 1977, 
3; cf. Weber 2013).  
Only systems such as these allow units and whole populations of units to be 
‘administered and co-ordinated’—and, one might add, whole populations of citizens or 
customers to be subjects who are objects of governing and/or marketing. Only thus is 
produced the process that Chandler calls ‘administrative coordination’ (1977, 6), 
prosecuted through the staff functions deploying whatever technologies are current for 
gathering, processing and disseminating information, and where the major difference lies 
in the extent to which forms of cost accounting have a strategically central role in co-
ordination (as discussed further in Hoskin and Macve 2000).  
Absent such a structure, the dominant previous form of structuring large entities, 
through drawing on some version of principal-agent relation, tends to have centrifugal 
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tendencies.23 In the particular case of the state, the sovereign has a range of senior advisers or 
ministers, but each tends to run a discrete fiefdom, as principal of a separate set of agents, in 
a set-up where the agents, if acting at a distance, will frequently have the upper hand, or be 
controlled only lightly through some form of periodic audit, which may or may not constitute 
a close questioning of acts of omission or commission. In our view, this is precisely the kind 
of loose control that Colbert does so much to counteract through his version of governing by 
inquiry (perhaps in part reflecting his Jesuit education as a child). But he cannot undo the 
overall principal-agent structuring: and indeed exploits it to secure his position as closest 
advisor and minister to Louis. 
What then appears is that this governing is not one that focuses on either the ‘population’ 
or the individuals who make it up as both objects of governing and active subjects with 
desires and interests which have to be managed but also encouraged. In this later phase, 
Foucault stresses how individuals are now approached as ‘individuals who are quite different 
from each other and whose behaviour, within a certain limit at least, cannot be accurately 
predicted’ (2007, 72). Similarly the population has ‘according to the first theorists of 
population in the eighteenth century...only one mainspring of action. This is desire.’ For the 
individual ‘(d)esire is the pursuit of the individual’s interest’ (2007, 73): so at the level of the 
population what has to be managed is ‘(t)he production of the collective interest through the 
play of desire’. So overall governing has to become ‘a management (gestion) of populations 
on the basis of the naturalness of their desire’ (2007: 73): which finally is why a population, 
like its individuals, is constituted not just as an object but as a ‘subject-object’, as he says 
more than once.24  
This is not the kind of art of governing that Colbert pursues in pursuing ‘raison d’État’. 
The scope and object of his inquiries never moves systematically to managing a population in 
                                                 
23 This tended to be the case in large entities such as the Roman Catholic Church or traditional armies/navies. At 
the same time, we note that certain entities, particularly the Jesuits, do from the 1500s develop a form of 
hierarchical structure which has forms of accountability and a tight top-down control of conduct (e.g. Quattrone 
2004, 2015). At the same time, the structure only enables co-ordination through the tight specification of action 
undertaken by all members of the order on a regular basis, from daily devotions to regular reviews of conduct. 
Hence understandably, the Order defines itself as a ‘body’ where all parts function only because there is total 
adherence by each subject to the interests of the whole (Bento da Silva 2012).This differs from the 
‘organisational’ form of co-ordination of subjects who pursue systematically different interests and activities. 
This is what is required, so Foucault argues, with modern populations, insofar as they are made up of subjects 
with desires (2007, 73). So ‘desire is the pursuit of the individual’s interest’ but such individual interests need to 
be reconciled with a collective interest: so what follows is a new idea ‘of a management of populations on the 
basis of the naturalness of their desire, and of the spontaneous production of the collective interest by desire’ 
(2007, 73).  
24 Thus, two pages previous to the introduction of his triangle, he defines population, there named as ‘subject-
object’, first ‘as the final end of government’ and then ‘as the end and instrument of government’. As such ‘it is 
the subject of needs and aspirations, but also the object of government manipulation’ (2007, 105-106).  
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this manner. Foucault suggests that perhaps the way that ‘management’ was generally 
understood as a term did not help. For it was still closely tied to the allocation (in Greek 
nomos) of the resources of the family (the Greek oikos).25 Hence the ‘economic’ was not 
perhaps a term that could aspire to function as a ‘level of reality’ as it could, once 
enables a new form of ‘economic truth’, as suggested above. Instead Foucault notes that 
word ‘economy’ as late as Rousseau (i.e. in the mid-eighteenth century) carries the old 
of ‘the wise government of the house for the common good of the whole family’ (2007, 
Consequently ‘(t)he problem, Rousseau says, is how to introduce the wise government of 
family….within the general management (gestion) of the state’ (2007, 95).  
Thus overall, we conclude that Colbert may indeed have had sophisticated ways of 
deploying his network of intendants and officers to generate his archive and so set up the 
possibility of a stunningly detailed and comprehensive form of ‘information management’. 
But he was not operating his network within a general line-and-staff structure which 
linked and co-ordinated all the departments of government (as in the classic Weberian or 
Chandlerian formulation).  
Instead, he was still operating within a principal-agent world, where his network 
reported only to him and all the information it provided remained his secret, except where 
he felt it appropriate to share it with Louis or one or two trusted confidantes with a ‘need 
to know’. This, we suggest, is also a, if not the, structural reason why his network could be 
dismantled so quickly and completely by Louis upon his death, along with the dispersal of 
his Library collections and the termination of his son’s prospects as future right-hand-man 
in the governing of Louis’s state.  
Taking these three observations into consideration, we conclude that (contra Miller, 
1990) Foucault conceptualises modern governmentality, in the form of governmental 
management, as systematically different from the Colbertian art of government.  Equally it 
follows, for us, that it is injudicious to equate too quickly the practices of modern 
managing with the kind of managing that Colbert undertakes (as per Soll 2009). Within 
the ‘administrative state’, the continuous creation of ‘calculable selves in calculable 
spaces’ as identified by Miller (1992) is absent: as is the possibility of whole populations 
of subjects making themselves up into selves who calculate as well as being calculable, in 
ways that promote a self-managing designed to succeed in meeting the targets that will 
ostensibly fulfil their desires. Foucault himself indicates the difference when he discusses 
                                                 
25 Oikos is here a designation which may extend to the family business as in Pacioli’s description (von Gebsattel 
1994) and to related business partnerships. 
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the view of the population held in the 1760s by the physiocrats (who are, for him, the first to 
visualise the problem of governing as managing a population with desires/interests), 
compared to that expressed in earlier mercantilist or cameralist texts. He suggests that the 
latter may have seen the population as a ‘source of wealth, and…having to be framed by a 
regulatory system…(but) basically see it only as the collection of a sovereign’s subjects’. So 
‘the mercantilist, cameralist, or if you like Colbertian project was situated within the relation 
of the sovereign’s will to the subjected will of the people’; but ‘with the physiocrats and more 
generally with the eighteenth-century economists…the population…will be considered as a 
set of processes to be managed (gérer) at the level and on the basis of what is natural in these 
processes’ (Foucault, 2007: 70, emphasis added).   
If the analysis so far has indicated some of the structural and processual limitations which, 
from our vantage point in the present world of management and accounting, we may now see 
as having been at work in even highly effective ways of governing the administrative state 
like that of Colbert, we would like now to turn to consider the practice which has been widely 
held up as the key to that effectiveness, including by both Miller and Soll: and that is the 
practice of ‘enquête’ (or ‘inquiry). Soll, as observed earlier, recognises that it has an ancestral 
pedigree as a term of administration, back to twelfth-century English inquisitiones (2009, 67). 
In our own early work on the genesis of DEB (Hoskin and Macve 1986, 110), we referred to 
another aspect of that pedigree, the development by Abelard in his Sic et Non (c. 1130 AD) of 
a new form of critical reading, which sought to establish the truth in situations where the truth 
was in doubt because different texts (in the first instance theological and biblical texts) said 
different things.  
However, we now see the significance of taking this previously rather perfunctory analysis 
of ancestral forms of inquiry further by opening up the possibility that inquiry is more than 
just an administrative device, or even an intellectual one: a possibility put into circulation in 
two slightly differing but complementary ways by Foucault and by Erwin Panofsky. For both 
identify inquiry as developing as a transformative new ‘mental habit’, in Panofsky’s 
formulation, and ‘form of truth’ in Foucault’s, emerging in the ‘middle of the middle ages’ 
for Foucault (2001, 5), and between 1130 and 1270 for Panofsky (1957, 21), with the latter 
also identifying Abelard as the individual who pioneered this intellectual breakthrough.  
Furthermore Panofsky specifies how this may in its way also be a transition point in 
Western reason, given that Abelard’s focus in the Sic et Non is on developing a new way of 
‘exposing the differences and even contradictions’ (1957, 66) in passages found in the Bible 
and the early Church Fathers, through a critical reading which involves textual criticism and 
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the comparing and resolving of all conflicts identified, to constitute out of discord and new 
concord that would constitute a now-unassailable truth. As Abelard himself puts it: ‘through 
doubting (dubitando) we come to inquiry (inquisitio); through inquiry we perceive the truth 
(veritatem)’.  
It is this new rigorous way of eliciting truth through eliminating contradiction that 
Panofsky proposes.  It becomes the new ‘mental habit’ which then spreads temporally and 
spatially across ‘the period from around 1130-40 to 1270’ and within the ‘100 mile zone 
around Paris’ (1957, 21), where it starts within the world of the Cathedral Schools and then 
crystallises and intensifies around 1200 in what will shortly become the new University of 
Paris.  
So we devote our next section to a more detailed analysis of what may now become 
apparent as more than just a way of governing but as a whole way of thinking that shaped 
acting in the pursuit of knowledge as much as the exercise of power, into the era of Colbert at 
least. We then consider how this form/mental habit translated across from intellectual to 
governmental spheres of thinking and acting, always focused on ascertaining the truth 
beneath a surface where truth mixes with error, deceit, and fraud, and so contributing to a 
governing that seeks to manage certain resources along with the activities of certain subjects 
(and particularly where those subjects are in possession of resources that should or could be 
claimed for the sovereign).  
In this respect, we seek to expand on one particular observation that Foucault makes, in 
addition to seeing it as ‘form of knowledge’, namely: ‘The inquiry is precisely a political 
form—a form of management and the exercise of power (une forme de gestion, d’exercice de 
pouvoir) that…became, in Western culture, a way of …collecting things that go to be 
regarded as true and transmitting them’ (2001, 51)’.26 Thus we may extend the understanding 
of inquiry as a truth-establishing device which, particularly in the hands of a skilled and 
methodical user such as Colbert, could be deployed in highly effective ways to increase the 
resources available to the administrative state, and thereby advance the best interests of the 
sovereign who was the state, in precise accordance with the principles of ‘raison d’État’. 
 
On the medieval genesis of ‘inquiry’ as ‘form of knowledge’, means to truth, and way to 
exercising a managerial power  
                                                 
26 We note the repeated differentiation, frequent in Foucault, of inquiry as ‘form’ at the level of savoir which 
then enables a range of knowledges as connaissances. We have therefore corrected the translation, particularly 
of the crucial phrase ‘une forme de gestion, d’exercice de pouvoir’ (1994, 588) which has been mis-rendered as 
‘a form of power management and exercise’ (2001, 51).  
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‘What is called the inquiry—the inquiry as practiced by philosophers of the fifteenth to 
eighteenth century, and also by scientists, whether they were geographers, botanists, 
zoologists or economists—is a rather characteristic form of truth in our societies’ (Foucault 
2001, 4). If one puts together this observation of Foucault with that immediately above on the 
inquiry as ‘form of management and exercise of power’, one has the full panoply of recursive 
Foucauldian terms circling round this particular technology or practice: and one may begin to 
see how Colbert’s deployment of inquiry for governing displays a ‘way of thinking’ or 
‘mental habit’, as Panofsky (1957) puts it, that moves across fields for the exercise of both 
knowing and power with apparent ease.  
The issue that then arises is its genesis or origin as practice with such significant shaping 
power. Foucault is clear, going on from calling the inquiry a ‘form of truth’, thus: ‘The 
inquiry made its appearance as a form of search for truth within the judicial order in the 
middle of the medieval era’ (2002, 5, emphasis added). But for Panofsky, with the starting 
point being Abelard, the initial dissemination is in that 100-mile radius round Paris, within a 
newly expanding elite pedagogic world, where ‘intellectual training shifted from the monastic 
schools to institutions urban rather than rural, cosmopolitan rather than regional, and so to 
speak only half ecclesiastic: to the cathedral schools, the universities, and the studia of the 
new mendicant orders, nearly all of them products of the thirteenth century’ (1957, 22).   
But it is not purely an ‘academic’ shift, this new ‘mental habit’: its proximate outcome, 
Panofsky claims, is a connection between the great new intellectual movement, 
Scholasticism, and the great new Gothic architectural movement, where experts begin to 
approach problems in the same way; but wider fields of expertise from music to art begin to 
demonstrate similar ways of thinking and acting. In this vein, our own work on the genesis of 
DEB (1986) also began with twelfth-century changes in ways of reading and forms of 
writing, within the elite pedagogic world of what became the university (albeit then with a 
focus on the ‘examination’ rather than ‘inquiry’ as the key knowledge-producing device 
which then was embodied in the practice of DEB).27 Interestingly for our analysis here, 
Foucault follows his initial observations on inquiry as ‘characteristic form of truth’ with the 
observation that it is displaced around 1800, as ‘other forms of analysis were 
                                                 
27 As noted, in the light of the material now available in Foucault (2007) our analysis there now needs 
correction. 
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invented…rather curious and particular forms of analysis that I shall call examination’ 
(2001, 5).28  
There is therefore a difference in these approaches at the level of provenance: that is, 
where inquiry in this new form comes from. Our view here is that Foucault is correct in 
seeing inquisitio as having a first major significance as a legal form of knowing, in a 
provenance which begins in Roman legal practice and follows into Carolingian and 
Merovingian Church Law practices in the eighth and ninth centuries, for instance where a 
Bishop would process through his diocese undertaking an inquisitio generalis or specialis 
(Foucault 2001, 51-52). Yet there is something procedurally distinct about the form of 
inquisitio which emerges, we would now argue, in the pedagogic setting in northern France in 
the early 1100s, crystallising in Abelard.  
The procedure he initiates proceeded in a manner not so different from the one that we 
have already seen in Colbert, but it is not the same as that followed by the earlier bishops. For 
that earlier process was primarily oral, although a written record would be kept. So the bishop 
may conduct a trial, but then, as Foucault notes, the trial will be terminated if a witness makes 
an oral confession of the type: ‘Yes, a crime was committed. It consisted in this. I am its 
author.’ (2001, 46). That possibility becomes procedurally excluded under the new form of 
inquisitio, since an oral confession cannot terminate the inquisitorial process. Everything 
pertaining to establishing the ‘truth’, judicial or theological, must first be gathered together, 
turned into writing, and then cross-referenced, that is, in a systematically ‘graphocentric’ 
procedure.  
This is what begins to happen in scholarly work on theology and canon law, in the 
generation after Abelard. For such scholars follow Abelard’s recommendations by first 
collecting all the relevant texts where conflicting statements were made, then developing 
systems for finding and cross-referencing such texts so that they begin to form a network of 
statements from within which the ‘truth’ may be extracted. But that truth extraction then 
requires the appropriate practice of critical reading, which follows the meticulous form of 
textual criticism that Abelard pioneered: first to establish the correct form of words of the 
statements in each relevant passage and then to interpret what those words say (through 
emergent techniques of commentary and hermeneutics). Only in this way will all 
contradictions and conflicts be resolved, so that discord will become concord as the truth 
                                                 
28 The linkage of inquiry to examination as forms of knowledge and of power carries over into the book that 
followed these lectures, Discipline and Punish (Foucault 1977), although the focus is much more on 
examination and the nineteenth-century context there.  
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lying beneath the fallible surface is established, in this progression from ‘doubt’ (a process of 
dubitatio sanctioned by Aristotle according to Abelard), on to ‘inquiry’ and so ultimately to 
‘truth’.29 This approach can then become a procedure within Church legal practice and 
transform it into the form of inquisitorial justice that is developed from the 1230s on, largely 
by graduates of the new universities, who are also often members of those new orders of 
friars, the Dominicans and Franciscans.30  
What we draw from this is that the significant transformations take place first in the 
pedagogic context not the juridical one. But across both there appear two new principles for 
the production of truth, which we see as different from those obtaining previously in the 
Western tradition. The first is at the level of the relation of speech to writing. It has often 
been remarked that ancient Greece and Rome although alphabetic cultures, retained a respect 
or preference for the voice over writing, a phonocentrism (e.g. Ong 2012). But here we see 
the beginnings of a systematic graphocentrism.  
This extends in many directions: a move towards silent reading rather than reading aloud, 
the incorporation of Arabic numerals alongside alphabetic writing, and at the level of 
alphabetic writing itself, a shift from having different alphabets for different ‘languages’ to 
using the Latin alphabet across vernaculars (Hoskin 2007; cf. Hoskin and Macve 1986).  
But here this move towards being centred on writing breaks through into the construction 
of truth. Foucault remarks on how by the fourteenth century there appear ‘types of inquiry 
that sought to establish truth on the basis of a certain number of carefully collected items of 
testimony in fields such as geography, astronomy, and the study of climates’ (2001, 49). 
Beyond these lie those seventeenth-century fields, general grammar, natural history, and the 
analysis of wealth, which he characterised in The Order of Things (Foucault 1974) as 
engaging in knowledge as ‘representation’. Panofsky sees the articulation of this kind of 
                                                 
29 However, this now appears to be based on a misreading in early-medieval Latin translations of Aristotle’s use 
in the Metaphysics (3.1) of Aristotle’s Greek term aporia, which signals reaching a no-way-out point in a 
dialectic game. This gets translated as dubitatio, which is a systematically different procedure, as developed in 
scepticism (and as to be developed in a systematically different way by Descartes). See Borgo (2014) who 
notes: ‘At least five Latin versions of the Metaphysics become available to readers between about 1125 and 
1270’ with the (mis)translations coming ‘at least four times from the Greek and at least once from the Arabic’.  
30 Given (1997) goes into the detail of the new technology of documentation that drives the Inquisitorial practice 
that begins with the drive against Catharism from the 1240s to eradicate heresy in the Occitan-speaking South 
West of France. All answers given by those summoned to testify to the inquisitors were now transcribed (note 
the transcription was always into Latin from whatever vernacular was employed, which in the 1240s case was 
typically Occitan rather than French). The set of testimonies was then, like those of the Church Fathers, read 
critically to establish in a preliminary way who was, and was not, a heretic. Suspects were then called back and 
re-examined, and any changes in their answers were challenged by reading back (with suitable retranslation 
from the written Latin text) what they had said before. Each written ‘dossier’ was part of a network of true or 
false statements which had to be critically read as a whole to establish who the heretics were and thus extirpate 
heresy definitively (Given 1997, see especially chapter 1, ‘The Technology of Documentation’).  
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graphocentric truth-production differently, finding its first intellectual expression in the work 
of the great Scholastics, and thence migrating into the thinking of the architects of the great 
urban Gothic cathedrals (1957, 43-53).  
Here he stresses the importance of orderliness and logic, not in the sense of the Scholastics 
thinking ‘in a more orderly and logical fashion than Plato and Aristotle’ but in making ‘their 
orderliness and logic palpably explicit’ (1957, 34). He further stresses how an ordering via 
articulation is part of this new order, and how it spreads across the intellectual, oral and 
visual spheres, so that ‘the intellectual articulation of the subject matter implies the acoustic 
articulation of speech by recurrent phrases, and the visual articulation of the written page by 
rubrics, numbers and paragraphs’ (1957, 38-39). This mental habit then affected all the arts. 
‘As music became articulated through an exact and systematic division of time, …so did the 
visual arts become articulated through an exact and systematic division of space’ (1957, 
39).31  
But where Panofsky is perhaps most insightful is through his specification of the three 
formal requirements for making true statements that follow from engaging in ‘inquiry’ in 
this explicit orderly and logical fashion. These requirements may be articulated first in 
Scholasticism, but they are then disseminated not only into Gothic architecture but into 
subsequent knowledge discourses across the centuries. He describes the requirements as 
follows: ‘(1) totality (sufficient enumeration), (2) arrangement according to a system of 
homologous parts and parts of parts (sufficient articulation), and (3) distinctness and 
deductive cogency (sufficient interrelation)’ (1957, 31): but further he makes it clear that 
here ‘sufficiency’ designates having precisely the relevant amount of each requirement, 
and no more.32  
This is what can then launch a ‘mental habit’ of seeking to establish truth through first 
gathering everything relevant, then imposing on it ‘a scheme of division and subdivision, 
condensable into a table of contents or synopsis, where all parts denoted by numbers or 
letters of the same class are on the same logical level’, a scheme that now obtains as he 
observes ‘from major works of scholarship’ to ‘doctoral theses’ (1957, 32), and which, we 
                                                 
31 The musical articulation also starts in the 100-mile radius, as ‘it was the Paris school of the thirteenth century 
that introduced the mensural notation of “breve”, “semibreve”, “minim”, etc, each of which is half the length of 
the previous one, with the “breve” or “short” note itself being half the length of the “longus”’ (1957, 39). 
32 So in terms of sufficient enumeration, ‘the High Gothic cathedral sought to embody the whole of Christian 
knowledge, theological, moral, natural, and historical, with everything in its place, and that which no longer 
found its place, suppressed’. So ‘structural design.. achieved an unparalleled balance between the basilica and 
the central design type, suppressing all elements that might endanger this balance, such as the crypt, the galleries 
and towers other than the two in front’ (Panofsky 1957, 44-45). 
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might add, is now globally disseminated as the default mode of computer-generated formats 
from word processing packages to slide-show presentations.  
So there is a first new principle of truth-production, we suggest: a systematic and never-
ending graphocentrism. But there is a second and complementary principle which follows 
from engaging in graphocentric truth-production. The knower or ‘truth-teller’ must adopt a 
location or ‘subject position’ where the graphocentric material can be both ‘read as a whole’ 
whole’ and ‘comprehended in all its parts’. This requires first being on the move, to assemble 
assemble the material required (i.e. everything relevant and nothing more) for ‘sufficient 
enumeration’. Then it requires moving around the ‘population’ of texts and statements now 
assembled, to re-assemble them into a readable network. But then comes immobility, in the 
sense of a subject-position where the reader can simultaneously ‘grasp together’ (literally 
‘com-prehend’) all the relevant and diverse surface statements and read beneath their surface 
to render visible the consistency that only such a reading can reveal, thus extracting from the 
discord of voices the new ‘concordant’ truth.  
Such a reading position, we suggest, is one of ‘synopsis’, a reading of all texts as one text, 
a reading only possible from an immobile location before the set of texts. In this respect, this 
is a first version of what Nagel (1989) would call ‘the view from nowhere’, since this is not a 
reading of a text in its original material setting but, to pick up another point of Panofsky’s, a 
reading of excerpts from texts removed to a new imaginary kind of space where they are 
located in an ‘immaterial projection plane…(which) renders account not only of what is seen 
but of the way it is seen under particular conditions’ (1957, 16). There is a range of work now 
(e.g. Blair 2010; Daston and Galison, 2007) which considers how in recent centuries the 
immobile reader in an imaginary space constitutes a ‘non-natural’ perspectival and thus 
objective view (and truth). But Panofsky draws us back to seeing a twelfth-century genesis 
for this too, which will lead by the early-fourteenth to ‘the emergence of a perspective 
interpretation of space’ originating with Giotto and Duccio, albeit ‘imperfectly handled at 
first’ (1957, 16); and he characterises this as a transformative way of seeing and reading the 
world, as it also transforms the ‘way of seeing…of sculptors and architects’ who began to 
comprehend the ‘forms they shaped not so much in terms of isolated solids as in terms of a 
comprehensive “picture space”’ albeit one that constitutes itself ‘in the beholder’s eye’.  
So this synopticism comprehends both a view from nowhere and a view onto a space that 
is immaterial but within which all texts can be variously located and read ‘all in one’ and 
‘one in all’. Thus we suggest that there is developed a new underlying principle of how to 
constitute truth:  a ‘graphocentric synopticism’. Under this principle, all the texts relevant and 
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only those must first be assembled (sufficient enumeration); they must then be readied for 
reading in what is thus an immaterial space, via the ‘view from nowhere’; thus they 
become a population of texts constructed just for the purpose in hand which are then 
gridded and cross-referenced in order to be readable as a whole and in all their relevant 
cross-referred detail (‘sufficient articulation’). The synoptic reader then tracks across the 
population of texts, reading this whole in all its parts for regularities, silences, 
consistencies and contradictions; inquiry duly undertaken then resolves the conflicting and 
discordant statements into a concordant truth (sufficient interrelation).  
A new principle of text and truth engagement is, therefore, brought out of concealment: 
graphocentric in a first sense since it depends upon turning everything into writing and 
setting it up as an über-text which is constructed as a meta-writing in a new ‘immaterial 
space’; and ‘synoptic’ since what is now brought together must be read so as to make both 
regularities and silences in this über-text visible with each other as the sole means to 
establish the true regularities beneath the surface of the über-text.33  
But as Foucault and Panofsky enable us to see, the form of ‘veridiction’ shifts not only 
across fields of knowledge, but remakes the exercise of power on the basis of knowledge, 
in what becomes an exercise in ‘graphocentric synopticism’, where all statements in a 
population of potential statements must be turned into writing and then rendered available 
for a synoptic reading in order to be re-written ‘in their truth’.  
This new way of thinking, which therefore remakes governing and truth-extraction in 
the form of the Inquisition, is what is extended by Colbert. But its principles, of sufficient 
enumeration, articulation and interrelation, apply equally to the form of accounting which 
becomes DEB. For if we consider its important features, they are all manifestations of 
these three procedures: first, all relevant transactions, and only those, must be entered into 
the books (sufficient enumeration); second, the entries must all be posted twice with cross-
referencing, and must be nested at the appropriate level within the set of books (sufficient 
articulation); and finally, the doubled entries must tally, with each other, and with the 
whole population of entries; only then may a ‘balance’ be struck and conclusions that are 
formally true, whether causal or quasi-causal, be drawn (sufficient interrelation).  
So armed with this expanded understanding of the genesis and form of knowledge and 
truth-production that is the inquiry, let us return to the two episodes where we see these 
                                                 
33 As in the discovery that the first three gospels in the New Testament of the Bible—those of Matthew, Mark 
and Luke—are, despite the critical scholarly identifications of individual variations, versions of the same stories 
with regularities of theme and narrative, and systematically different from what is contained in the fourth 
gospel, that of John: so that they become the ‘synoptic gospels’ (e.g. Goodacre 2001). 
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dynamics playing out within the French administrative state, as the inquiry extends its scope 
to operating as ‘form of management’, and way of enabling ‘the exercise of power’.  
 
‘L’État, c’est quoi?’ On ‘inquiry’ and DEB as forms of management and governmental 
practice in the grand siècle 
We have indicated where there are theoretical and historical limitations of the previous 
linkings of the Colbert episode to modern discourses of ‘governmentality’ and of modern 
management. We have also shown how material from Foucault (Foucault 2001), which has 
become more recently available/retranslated now, alongside the analysis of Panofsky (1957), 
enables us to unravel the ‘long history’ of inquisitio / inquiry / enquête that dominates the 
construction of ‘truth’ until the advent of examination in the nineteenth century. Now we 
return to reconsider our two episodes, with a special focus first on the ways in which Colbert 
deployed ‘government by inquiry’ and DEB, particularly in the ‘Colbert period’ (1661-1683), 
and thereafter on the ways in which the Paris brothers deployed DEB in a sense against, or 
potentially beyond, ‘government by inquiry’, across a period which arguably begins in 1712 
and lasts till 1726, when they end their involvement in the governing of the state.  
In the two episodes, we see in play both the textual and critical reading practices first 
articulated in these earlier centuries, although now in different interrelations. But what we 
now seek to do is consider how these interrelations play out, at the level of historical practice, 
by looking at the art of governing manifest in the activities of both Colbert and the Paris 
brothers as instances, in another of Foucault’s phrases, of ‘the State as way of doing things, 
the State as way of thinking’ (Foucault 2007, 358). To do so, we need also to address the 
claims that have been made (e.g. Soll 2014; Lemarchand 1999) for the role of DEB.34 
 
The Colbert episode 
There is an important respect in which both our episodes are, we would say, structurally 
linked. In practice, the protagonists in each episode have to operate both with and against 
principal-agent ways of doing things.  
Hence Colbert, for instance, has to have his private network of intendants and officers, 
operating as agents for him as principal, even as they tackle the consequences of other 
principal-agent networks, including those of the tax farmers and of his ministerial rivals.  
                                                 
34 We shall argue that it does not need or attempt to deploy Mattessich’s (2000) ‘full logic of DEB’ as defined in 
our Introduction. 
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However, once his own principal-agent structure has become dominant, Colbert works 
successfully to keep the King close, not least through using inquiry, in the form of a forensic 
accounting of the activities of the tax farmers who (he has no doubt) are serving themselves 
far more effectively than they are the King.  
Similarly, he draws on the principles and practices of DEB in such ways as he can. For 
instance, he recommends the system to the young Louis as something highly desirable. 
But accounting’s value as form of ‘order’ is embodied for Louis by Colbert in the ‘Golden 
Notebooks’ (Soll 2009, 64-66), which he presented to Louis each year, starting from 1661, 
as ‘abridgements’ of the state accounts, with concise summaries typically of annual 
expenditures and earnings, ‘but they also detailed and compared the income from each tax 
farmer, …final single-entry tallies of spending as compared with cash on hand… (and) 
comparisons such as tax farmer income between 1661 and 1665’ (Soll 2009, 66): so not 
apparently in DEB. And while these notebooks had an ostensive value, in themselves they 
cannot indicate just how active Louis was in either the analysis of the accounts or the 
possible formulation of policy from them (cf. Soll 2014, 95). 
What they do indicate however is how crucial to Colbert from the start of his hold on 
power in 1661 was the objective of imposing ‘order’ on the activities of tax officials, if he 
was to improve the finances of the Crown: which is the same issue that would occupy the 
Paris brothers and the Ministers of State to Louis XV some fifty years later. But so far as 
actually putting the ‘full logic’ of DEB to use to run the state in some form of modern 
financial management (or even some form of financial management as practised by those 
households who deployed DEB from the fourteenth century on), there is no evidence that 
it was ever considered as a realistic option by Colbert.  
Here, we would agree with Lemarchand that the evidence indicates that attempting this, 
or ‘thinking’ it, was very much the agenda that the Paris brothers entertained in the 1720s. 
But even there the existing principal-agent structures (and those who profited from them) 
ensured that their vision came to nothing. So in this way of thinking the state could not 
result in a comparable acting.   
So on DEB, while Soll concludes that there was ‘a sophisticated form of state 
accounting…during the ministry of Colbert’, at the same time, he concedes that on the 
evidence it appears that ‘true double entry was not done at an official level’ (2009, 64) and 
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in the end Louis’s own mastery of accounting extended to no more than ‘complex single-
entry form’ (2014, 95).35  
So what was done? Here we turn to our close reading of the extent and limits to Colbert’s 
use of DEB in the pursuit of the tax farmers, as discussed by Soll (2009, 61-64) but also as 
decodable from a re-reading of the specific document he discusses there, Colbert’s 1663 
document, ‘Mémoires sur les affaires des finances de France’ (Colbert 1863), written by 
Colbert specifically for Louis: which in our view is an excellent (and probably successful) 
example of seeking to bind Louis closer, by means of working through, and being seen to 
work through, inquiry.  
The text is wide ranging: but the particular focus of our interest is on precisely how he 
went about extracting, on a more timely basis, far more of the tax revenues due to the Crown 
from the tax farmers than was then the case. First Colbert describes the forensic accounting 
type of critical reading that he undertakes (but always, he is careful to say, in conjunction 
with Louis) across the three major Registers in which tax entries were accumulated in 
interlocking format. He describes how ‘they’ extracted from these Registers all anomalies 
and omissions, and so established what revenues and resources should be accruing to the 
state: and finally how they were able to exact what was due and then consider what penalties 
or sanctions might be brought against miscreants.36 
In the Appendix, we give a close shadowing of Colbert’s text (with the French where 
helpful) to bring across how far this is a set-up that is inquisitorial in the Abelardian (and 
DEB) manner, but one that is totally run and managed by Colbert—more so even perhaps 
than Soll conveys insofar as the text shows how far Louis is shepherded into a figurehead role 
of ‘inquisitorial reader’ of the forensic audit undertaken via the Tax Registers. So, yes it is a 
meticulous form of forensic audit: but no, it is not a use of the ‘full logic’ of DEB to 
‘manage’ the affairs of a whole estate or set of enterprises, as could be done at the level of the 
family (whether engaged in farming, commerce or banking). Finally, it is a process where 
Colbert leads and Louis undertakes only the ritual last stage of the synoptic and graphocentric 
mode of inquiry. All the hard work of detailed information collection and processing is done 
(and stage managed) by Colbert (Soll 2014, 95), but in such a way that he does bind Louis 
                                                 
35 Professor Soll has confirmed to us in correspondence that in his view Louis had a sense of accounts, but could 
not keep them, though there is a letter to his mother in which he brags about learning accounting. This appears 
consistent with the description Colbert gives in 1663 of Louis’s engagement with the state accounts in his 
‘Mémoires sur les affaires des finances de France’ (Colbert 1863), which suggests that Louis could do a 
superficial audit, but not actually keep books. For further detail, see Appendix.  
36 This last is something on which Colbert is very keen, but the narrative makes it clear between the lines that 
Louis was less so, and so swingeing penalties are not exacted. 
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closely to him successfully until his death in 1683—when Louis thereupon dismantles 
Colbert’s system and ensures that he is never bound in such a way again.  
 
The Paris brothers episode 
The brothers were commissioned in 1716 by the Duc de Noailles, the Finance Minister 
the accession of the young Louis XV, to implement their plan whereby DEB was to 
as a form of audit and control over the financiers and comptables charged with delivering 
the direct tax revenues known as the recettes générales. The specifics (Lemarchand 1999, 
230-231) were to require the comptable in each of the twenty tax jurisdictions 
(généralités) of the state to submit a day-book every two weeks recording in strict 
chronological order (and with no gaps on the pages) all their ‘real-time’ entries of tax-
related receipts and expenditures.  
These day-books, if not in DEB already, would then be put by the central 
administrative office into DEB format thus enabling the construction of ‘a general day-
book kept in double-entry’ and thereafter the construction of ledgers, from which ‘a 
compte particulier (particular account) was opened for each comptable and a compte 
générale (general account)…for each category of receipt or expense’ (Lemarchand 1999, 
232).  
Lemarchand makes two other things clear: first, that this was seen as a first step in a 
more general reform of the state finances drawing on DEB’s potential for remaking the 
actions of agents in the interests of their principal; and second, that the impetus for this 
initiative came from an earlier initiative of 1712, where Antoine de Paris had used this 
approach and ‘successfully reorganized the recette générale of the Dauphiné, by 
introducing double-entry accounting’ (1999, 230). 
The immediate advantage, as emphasised by Lemarchand, over the existing ‘charge-
and-discharge’ accounting system (which had left accounts unsettled often for many years, 
requiring the state to borrow its own money from the financiers at a heavy interest cost) 
was to enforce speedy remittance of the revenues as regularly reported in the day-books. 
The attempt to generalise the system was delayed until after 1720, as there was a hiatus in 
their government work as they ran afoul of John Law before the implosion of the latter’s 
financial re-engineering project in 1721. They did then seek to extend the earlier system, 
but found increasing resistance from the financiers and their allies. In consequence from 
1726 the system was abandoned and the old principal-agent regime, based on ‘charge-and-
discharge’ accounting, returned (Soll 2014, 133-4).  
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From this, several issues arise. First, there is a technical-conceptual accounting issue, 
concerning just how essential was DEB as such to bringing accounting into the ‘art of 
governing’ here. For while the journals, and the related prompt balancing of each collector’s 
ledger account and collection of the amounts due, were the key to this operation, it is not 
clear that the rest of the DEB architecture (cf. Mattessich 2000; Sangster 2016) provided 
much if any added value. We note in this respect that Lemarchand observes that the full 
potential of a DEB system was not employed since the system was not designed to give a 
statement of the state’s property, but simply to follow the cash flows (1999, 233). Its 
summaries, therefore, probably could have been accomplished by more simple classification 
in single-entry books. Since Lemarchand’s article does not illustrate a complete set of entries 
through the entire system, it appears possible that the system only works, insofar as it works, 
through enacting aspects of the DEB process alongside the typical practices involved in 
‘inquiry’ (‘enquête’), particularly those involving agents (like Colbert’s intendants) reporting 
exclusively to their principal, in this case the Paris brothers.37 
Second, there is the issue of the structure of governing in a world of principal-agent 
relations. In the initial successful intervention by Antoine de Paris in the Dauphiné, he is the 
principal and in direct charge of the Tax Registers, and so able to undertake an intervention 
analogous to that of Colbert in 1661, through an analogous use of DEB for a forensic audit of 
sins of omission and commission. But additionally at this regional level, he can impose 
through prescription the timely remission of revenues on his direct-line agents and impose the 
kind of order on their conduct which Savary’s texts sought to impose on merchants (Miller 
1990).  
However, when it comes to the subsequent attempt to make this approach work at the 
whole-state level, the centrifugal tendencies in the principal-agent structure come virulently 
into play. So the (re)introduction in 1716 of DEB as a control and audit device to ‘manage’ 
the financiers who raise and remit the taxes across all the tax jurisdictions fails to break their 
power, as there is no sufficient central and centripetal counter-force to compel these second-
tier principal-agent structures to conform wherever one or more financiers resist.  
Thus at the level of the ‘way of thinking’, there could be the vision that it might be 
feasible to break the power that the ‘agents’ had in the traditional ‘principal/agent’ mode of 
raising taxes; it might be possible to overcome the delays and excessive deductions suffered 
                                                 
37 Lemarchand (1999, 236) gives examples of other ‘one-off’ essays promoting the use of DEB in state affairs. 
There is a wider accounting issue implicit here, which is just how necessary or valuable a DEB approach is to 
the art of governing even today (e.g. Broadbent and Guthrie 1992; Hood 1995). 
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by the state under the previous ‘charge-and-discharge’ accounting system that deferred 
settlement of the net balances due until long after the Treasury had been compelled, for 
of ready cash, to borrow from those same financiers at burdensome rates of interest 
(Lemarchand, 1999). But this did not, in the event, translate to the general level of the 
of acting’.  
This structural limitation remains in play thereafter, if anything even more virulently, 
when the brothers, after 1720, seek to extend this form of what we might call 
‘management via DEB’ to controlling the state finances generally. Arguably the virulence 
is compounded because of the further vision, which Lemarchand notes (1999, 225), of 
seeking to align this use of DEB with a more general administrative reform of the structure 
of governing, which would have replaced ‘a set of decentralized contractual relations with 
a centralized bureaucratic administration’, thus constituting an early example of the 
emergence of Foucauldian ‘disciplinary technologies’. 
This remains an intriguing possibility, as Lemarchand poses the question of how far the 
system as envisaged was a form of what one might describe as modern managerial co-
ordination and control implicating ‘double entry as a disciplinary technology’ (1999, 241-
5). This takes us back to Foucault’s distinction between inquiry and examination as forms 
of knowledge, and his stress on how the examination constitutes a new ‘knowledge 
(savoir) of man’ in a way that ‘engendered an utterly new type of subject of knowledge’ 
(2001, 2).  
At the same time, we draw on earlier historical-theoretical analyses of the difference 
made by examination in making possible modern management (e.g. Hoskin and Macve, 
1988) and their historical tracing of how it is not examination as such but the new formal 
characteristics that examination develops in elite European higher education settings from 
the 1760s which give this ‘form of knowledge’ the transformative significance that 
Foucault (e.g. 1977, 184-194) attributes to it. These characteristics are first, the shifting of 
examining practice from being predominantly oral (as had been the case since the 
emergence of the university) to predominantly written; and second, the introduction of a 
unilinear form of numerical grading, a practice found neither in earlier European forms of 
examining nor in significant and long-lived systems elsewhere, such as the Chinese (cf. 
Elman 2000).  
 
 
Postscript: From ‘synoptic graphocentrism’ to ‘grammatocentric panopticism’  
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In the light of the foregoing analyses, we offer, before our conclusion, two ‘postscript’ 
reflections—one on the system of ‘governing by inquiry’ as a form of ‘synoptic 
graphocentrism’, and the second on the relation between the ‘examination’ as subsequent 
‘form of knowledge’, according to Foucault, and the form of power that he names as 
‘panopticism’. Here he says, in consecutive sentences (Foucault 2001, 58) firstly, ‘We live in 
a society where panopticism reigns’; and secondly, ‘Panopticism is a form of power than 
rests not on the inquiry but on…the “examination”‘.  
So, firstly, we suggest that the key factor in making ‘governing by inquiry’ work, as 
illustrated by Colbert’s success, is the ability to function as a single conduit through which all 
information generated by inquiry comes to one location where it can then be subjected to a 
unitary and ‘synoptic’ critical reading of all the material turned into writing.  
But our suggestion, that the system of ‘information management’ in this respect is not just 
‘graphocentric’ but also constitutes a form of ‘synoptic graphocentrism’, is an analytical 
attempt to mark out what it is distinctive and new not just at the level of a form of knowledge, 
nor even of a form of knowledge-based power, but at the level of a form of ‘veridiction’, a 
way of constituting statements that can then, with ‘synoptic graphocentrism’ as principle of 
thought and action, be adjudged true or false. At the level of the ‘art of governing’, we would 
argue that Colbert never moves beyond ‘governing by inquiry’, and that his form of 
‘managing’ and his way of using DEB to conduct forms of forensic audit both confirm that.  
At the same time, the level and intensity of the way in which he deploys the principle of 
‘synoptic graphocentrism’ goes beyond any art of governing up till then: and arguably it is 
not outdone until the moment, some 80 years later, where the first subsequent forms of 
governmental management could begin to be articulated. That level and intensity are what is 
lost as soon as Louis XIV dismantles his system following Colbert’s death, so that Louis does 
then become his own ‘principal’, but a principal who now presides over a dispersed set of 
agents who are again permitted and even encouraged to give their rivalry full play.  
Secondly, what follows synoptic graphocentrism, as a principle of thinking and acting? 
How does it become possible to develop a centripetal form of structuring action such as the 
line-and-staff system identified by Chandler (1977) and to link it to the new range of forms of 
cost and management accounting, as supplements to DEB, which produce the business form 
of ‘governmental management’ (Hoskin and Macve 2000)? The answer given by Foucault 
(1977; 2001) is ‘panopticism’, of which he says (2001, 58): ‘The Panopticon is the utopia of a 
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society and a type of power that is basically the society we are familiar with at present, a 
utopia that was actually realized’.  
But this then poses, now, the possibility of re-thinking the relations of continuity and 
discontinuity here: of inquiry and/versus examination, and of synopticism and/versus 
panopticism. In this regard, the discussion of DEB as potential ‘disciplinary technology’ 
(Lemarchand 1999, 241-5) nicely points up a gap which is illustrative of the discontinuity 
involved here, between the ‘motivational’ way in which the Paris brothers, and others 
concerned with the art of government in the early 1700s, conceive of reconciling the 
comptables to their DEB system and the kind of solution advanced some 80 years later.  
Lemarchand (1999) draws extensively on a Traité of 1733, probably written by Paris la 
Montagne, which at one point considers how a ‘stick and carrot’ system might have 
worked to get most of the comptables at least on board. It says: ‘it would be necessary to 
make an example of comptables that were found acting illegally or embezzling’; but then 
there could be a separate reward system for granting ‘some indulgence, and even…a 
money bonus to comptables that distinguish themselves through good conduct’ (1999, 
244).  
This approach, where reward and punishment systems are separate, is then contrasted to 
the different solution to getting the tax remittances from the receivers general submitted on 
time to the Caisse de Service as developed in 1806 by Mollien, Napoleon’s Minister of 
Finance. Now we find an integrated and unilinear merit/demerit form of 
reward/punishment, constituting ‘a mechanism of incentives and dissuasions that was as 
simple as it was clever’ (Lemarchand 1999, 245). The contract due date for receipt marks 
the dividing point between the positive and negative forms of ‘reinforcement’, so that 
sums submitted by the receivers general before the contract due date ‘entitled them to 
interest, while a penalty interest was levied on the sums that they kept after the due date’ 
(1999, 245).  
In the approach of Mollien we arguably see the enactment of a new way of thinking and 
acting which acts on the actions of others by presenting them with a situation where they 
can now not avoid ‘calculating’ the consequences of their actions on a scale that 
automatically gives either a plus/profit/merit or a minus/loss/demerit outcome dependent 
upon the timing of their action. This is precisely the way of acting that Foucault describes 
(1977, 180) as produced under discipline as ‘punishment is only one element of a double 
system: gratification-punishment’ which then proves to be predicated on the move to a 
unilinear scale of valuing conduct, so that: ‘all behaviour falls in the field between good 
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and bad marks, good and bad points’, wherein ‘it is possible to quantify this field and work 
out an arithmetical economy based upon it. A penal accountancy, constantly brought up to 
date, makes it possible to obtain the punitive balance-sheet of each individual’. Except of 
course this is not a punitive balance sheet or penal accountancy, but a unilinear valuing of 
rewards and punishments: it is a form of ‘generalised human accounting’ that marks the 
move beyond an economy of conduct where ‘rewards’ are in one currency (e.g. prizes, big 
salaries) and punishments in another (corporal punishment, the sack). 
It is also under this unilinear valuing that the norm can play out its brilliant and new 
tripartite game38 of managing conduct across a ‘population’ of ‘subjects with interests’ (to 
introduce here two of the constructs central to ‘governmental management’ which Foucault 
(2007) introduces). For each and all are now located in a managed and manageable 
environment so that there is a chance of individual and collective interests coinciding. As 
Foucault puts it, the norm ‘differentiates individuals from one another, in terms of the 
following overall rule: that the rule be made to function as a minimal threshold, as an average 
to be respected, or as an optimum towards which one must move’ (1977, 182-3, emphasis 
added). The same applies with ‘standards’ of course, so that all and individually, from the 
best of good children to the worst of recidivists. can be put into series of populations which 
are just differentiated enough by the particular choice of norm criterion made to enable the 
marvellously proliferating forms of naming and counting, and meta-naming and meta-
counting which mark out accounting as valuing technology par excellence of the past two 
centuries.  
But does this general human accounting deliver the ‘panopticism’ that is expressed in 
Bentham’s Panopticon, the subject of Foucault’s particular analytical focus? In the light of 
our characterisation of synopticism, we would suggest that Bentham’s utopian space is less 
panopticon than synopticon, where everything is made visible to the one still viewpoint, that 
of the gaoler in the central tower who may see but not be seen.39 
So we suggest that ‘panopticism’ is a term that requires re-thinking, first, because it is not 
just a new dream but an ancient utopian vision—as Foucault remarks (2007, 66): ‘we can say 
                                                 
38 The introduction of such a system of ‘merits’ and ‘demerits’ in disciplining the nineteenth-century West Point 
cadets who went on to build the American ‘managerial revolution’ is explored in Hoskin and Macve 1988. 
39 Indeed Bentham can be argued to be one of the last great thinkers of the era of synopticism, and never more 
so perhaps than in his great pedagogic work, the Chrestomathia (1817/1983), the compendium of all ‘useful 
learning’ that should be internalised by the truly knowledgeable subject. For his is a text that constructs the 
genera and species of all useful knowledge, made visible in a chart precisely like those of Natural History, 
folded within the book’s front cover, and which, when unfolded, displays all those genera and species to 
simultaneous inspection from the viewpoint of the critical reader (initially Bentham but then each of us) as a 
classic graphocentric truth. 
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that the panopticon is the oldest dream of the oldest sovereign’: and second, because its 
success as utopia made real is not in this synoptic version of the panopticon that Bentham 
constructs. For the successful forms of pan-opticon, as the name may suggest, turn out to 
operate beyond any single synoptic view: to be pan-optic it must be made up of a 
of views, and particularly synoptic ones. So rather trying to be an (impossible) view of 
Everywhere from the viewpoint of the One, the possibility of panopticism requires the 
construction ideally from Everywhere of a whole population of synoptic views.40 Indeed, 
insofar as the system succeeds as ‘realised utopia’, we suggest it does so because 
individual subjects do, in their ways of thinking and acting, learn to become selves who do 
not just ‘have the individuality.... of the calculable human’ (Foucault 1977, 193, emphasis 
added), or of the human just as accountable, but who also engage in an active calculating 
and accounting of self and others.  
Foucault suggests something of this kind in his 1973-1974 lectures, Psychiatric Power, 
where he suggests that ‘disciplinary power is individualizing’ because of how it links 
subject and ‘somatic singularity’ through ‘a system of supervision-writing, by a system of 
pangraphic panopticism’ (Foucault 2006, 55, emphasis added). While O’Farrell (2005, 
127) has suggested that the phrase is a ‘colourful creation’’ we would suggest that it 
signals the importance more generally of re-thinking what constitutes panopticism and 
how it functions—both as successful utopia and dystopia to be resisted—as a way of 
thinking and acting for those humans who now constitute populations of subjects with 
disparate interests.  
Our own formulation is that this is more a ‘grammatocentric panopticism’, a term we 
first ‘floated’ over two decades ago (Hoskin and Macve 1993). But now we see it not as a 
term floating in its own space, but a construct precisely differentiable from but building 
upon ‘graphocentric synopticism’, in extending both of the latter’s constituent terms. For 
as panopticism can, we have argued, be differentiated from yet seen as an extension of the 
                                                 
40 Of course it has long been noted that the Bentham vision of the Panopticon did fail as individual inmates 
found spaces of invisibility, thus negating the seeming strength of the single-viewpoint subject position. But 
synoptic views from everywhere can resist in multiple forms. Savage (1998, 78) draws on the Memoirs of a 
Station Master on the British Great Western Railway (Simmons 1974/1879) to show how the Railway’s top 
management sought to exercise the panoptic principle by having Superintendents undertake surprise inspections 
on trains (i.e. shrouding them with the invisibility cloak of secrecy so beloved of Colbert) so that ‘railway 
workers…would routinely behave as if a Superintendent might actually appear to observe them’. But Simmons 
records how dispersed synoptic views forestalled surprises, with ‘telegraph operators telling station clerks of 
impending visits, allowing the station master to be fetched from the pub and a hectic tidying up of the premises 
to ensue’ (Savage 1998, 78). Here we see one early step in the ever-escalating arms race of surveillance versus 
anti-surveillance, panopsis versus anti-panopsis. (US railroad precedents and parallels are discussed in Hoskin 
and Macve 2000.)   
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synoptic subject position of the Abelardian ‘critical reader’, so can the truth-statements 
produced under the particular form of graphism that begins to circulate increasingly from the 
the sixteenth century.  
The turning of everything into writing, that is, a ‘graphocentrism’, has by the 1300s begun 
begun to incorporate both alphabetic and Arabic numeral signifiers into ‘alphanumeric’ 
signifier sets.  The latter are then increasingly supplemented with charts, graphs and ‘visuals’, 
‘visuals’, in fields from natural history to Bentham’s Chrestomathic pedagogy to those 
emergent fields that become modern economics and accounting. Here, ‘such visual 
techniques are not mere adjuncts to a deeper and prior analytical procedure’ but instead ‘all 
‘all these charts, figures, diagrams, tables and symbols are the very way we conceptualize and 
know the economy and the firm’ (Thompson 1998, 286).   
So the ‘panopticism’ through which we now think and act is not just, we suggest, a turning 
of everything into writing (and so a pan-graphism). Instead it draws upon multiple sets of 
signifiers, or ‘grammata’ to use the Greek term. Thus our suggestion is that a ‘graphocentric 
synopticism’ gives way to a ‘grammatocentric panopticism’ rather than a ‘pangraphic’ one. 
Here is a possible opening move for a renewed historical-theoretical debate, perhaps around 
the continuities and discontinuities between ‘governing by inquiry’ and ‘governmental 
management’.  
 
Concluding comments 
We have sought to open up here a space for new discussion of how historically specific 
forms of accounting and management may have operated in governmental discourse and 
practice in the world of the French ‘administrative monarchy’ and beyond by reconsidering 
two cases. First, Colbert’s governing by inquiry’ (1661-1683), understood as a form of 
‘managing’ the French state under Louis XIV, and incorporating the use of DEB in forensic 
auditing of tax farmer revenues. Second the episode (1712-1726) of the Paris brothers, where 
DEB is deployed in a similar forensic auditing of tax practice for the state, and proposed as 
more general means of managing/governing it.   
We have reviewed the interpretations of governing this state made by Miller (1990) and 
Soll (2009; 2014), drawing upon Foucault’s (2007) analysis that, in the administrative 
monarchies, governing as managing is ‘blocked’ at the level of the state though articulated at 
the family level, and that this changes only with the genesis of a later ‘governmental 
management’ (2007: 106). In this light, we see Miller as over-interpreting the closeness of 
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Colbert’s ‘governing by inquiry’ to modern ‘governmentality’, and Soll as eliding key 
differences between modern managing and accounting practice and Colbert’s practice as 
‘Information Master’, where he still has to govern via a ‘centrifugal’ principal-agent 
structure. This we see as changing only when large entities moved to a ‘centripetal’ 
structuring of the line-and-staff system type (Chandler 1977), and deploy forms of cost or 
‘management accounting’ as supplements to DEB. 
With the Paris brothers we have also problematised the extent to which DEB was central 
to what they achieved in improving tax administration, or capable of supporting their wider 
attempted reforms of the management of the state (cf. Lemarchand, 1999). 
Locating these episodes in the longue durée of Western thought and ‘governmental 
management’ we have also drawn on Foucault’s earlier analysis of ‘inquiry’ (enquête) as 
dominant ‘form of knowledge’ from the 1200s to 1800, when it is displaced, he says, by 
‘examination’ (Foucault 2001); however we specify the former’s genesis to a new form of 
critical reading, ‘inquisitio’, as developed by Abelard (cf. Hoskin and Macve 1986).  
We have argued that both DEB as ‘mode of veridiction’ and Colbert’s ‘governing by 
inquiry’ are manifestations of this inquisitorial form of knowledge, although in this era the 
former operates extensively only at the level of the family. Both, we argue, exhibit a principle 
of ‘graphocentric synopticism’ as a general way of reading and acting on the world, 
preceding and shaping the later ‘panopticism’ that Foucault identifies as modern form of 
power. We note in this regard that Foucault himself proposes that ‘panopticism is a form of 
power than rests not on the inquiry but on...the “examination”’ (2001, 58). Inquiry and/versus 
examination: synopticism and/versus panopticism: these are relations which we suggest may 
now be re-thought, extending the kind of historical-theoretical approach to modern 
governmental and business management initiated here.  
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Appendix. 
Colbert’s ‘Mémoires sur les affaires des finances de France’ of 1663 
We provide here a close shadowing of Colbert’s text which we discuss in the main body of 
the paper (with the French where helpful) to bring across how far this is a set-up that is 
inquisitorial in the Abelardian (and DEB) manner, but one that is totally run and managed by 
Colbert—more so even than Soll brings across.  
In the text, from pages 39 to 41, Colbert discusses the setting up of the system of close 
scrutiny of the accounts as follows. He notes first the zeal of the King in establishing the 
‘Conseil royal des finances’, which will stop one or two officers or servants to the King 
keeping financial procedures and outcomes to themselves; and he praises the Royal wisdom 
for making this happen thanks first to the King’s commitment to establishing special Conseils 
to decide what to do: second to Louis’s own natural shining lights as King (les seules 
lumières naturelles du Roy); and third to his commitment of time to ‘the conduct of his affairs 
for the good of the people and his own glory’ (40).  
We then learn that in terms of specific actions, Louis (i) got rid of the surintendant 
function, (ii) took on the responsibility for inspecting all shipments and expeditions 
(expéditions) both in terms of receipts and expenditures (recettes and dépenses), and (iii) 
formed the new Conseil royal des finances with five members, which he has always attended 
or held in person three times a week (lequel il a toujours tenu en personne trois fois la 
semaine) (40). The five Conseil members have proposed business or what is to be done (les 
affaires), and the King has resolved them (les résout). He has also ordered that one of the 
five, who perhaps unsurprisingly turns out to be the Intendant des finances (i.e. Colbert), 
should keep the record of receipts and expenditures (tiendroit registre de la recette et de la 
dépense). And this, Colbert then narrates, has corrected for ever (corrigeait pour jamais) all 
the abuses caused by allowing sovereign authority (l’autorité souveraine) in the hands of 
single individuals. 
Then Colbert describes the process of reviewing the accounts to identify malfeasance and 
track progress. He notes how Louis early in 1661 took three important decisions. The first 
was to initial (parapher) all the registers of the Treasury/Exchequer (Épargne / Espargne) to 
stop the disorder where payments could be drawn on funds not yet consumed (French is: pour 
éviter le désordre des billets qui pouvoient ester tirés sur des fonds non consommés). The 
second was to examine the actual state of the finances to render the account for them 
(d’examiner l’état actuel des finances pour luy en rendre compte). The third was to examine 
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closely whether it would be advantageous for the service to establish a severe Judicial 
Process (Chambre de Justice) against the culpable finance officials or to reduce them via 
taxes (a footnote is added ‘or to make them submit to reparations (amendes)’).   
Colbert then goes on to consider how these three great decisions played out. The first 
shows how via the use of the paraph (as information finding device) it was possible to 
identify funds dissipated from the Exchequer by close reading of the Registers for the 
years 1656-8. (He also notes that the earlier ones were not available, with the relevant 
Treasury/Exchequer officials claiming that they had been burned, on the grounds that they 
were supposedly not required to keep these records under the regulations.) In any event, 
Colbert then says that once the registers were paraphed ‘by the sole instinct and admirable 
sense of your Majesty’, there was this new insight into the condition of the state finances 
out of sight from the officials below, sc. ‘without people knowing why you gave this 
order, and without those who executed the order nor the treasurers of the Exchequer 
knowing for what it would be useful’.  
Then we get: ‘The execution of the second order was more difficult, it being a question 
of examining in detail the state in which his Majesty had found his finances, which 
consisted of a great discussion. Nevertheless, with his Majesty (sa Majesté) arousing 
himself (excitant elle-mesme) totally to the work, by his examples and by the marks of his 
goodness (bonté) and his confidence, shortly afterwards one could make him see this state 
through which he understood clearly’. That ‘make him see’ is, we suggest, telling: it 
indicates that it is not Louis, but an unnamed other, presumably Colbert, who does all the 
key work, either directly or through aides, and thus establishes the true relations between 
entries and the points where funds or entries disappeared from view. This enables Louis to 
be in a position to lead all subsequent discussions on anomalies or cases where it was felt 
that crimes or culprits could be identified. Thus Colbert is the provider of the ‘visibles’ 
that could make Louis ‘see this state through which he understood clearly’.41  
Finally, there is the process by which Louis engages with the books that have been 
prepared by Colbert. Here we find the following: First, there is the Journal, with all the 
                                                 
41 The language is consistently revealing through these passages: the things to be made visible are located and 
identified through the initial critical reading of the population of relevant texts, and are then made visible 
through their re-arrangement into a new text constructed through a second critical reading that resolves the 
contradictions and omissions identified through the first critical reading. This new text re-writes the errors 
through first juxtaposing and then resolving them through appropriate (written) logical or empirical analysis and 
so rendering their falsehood self-evident to the one who is led, with all due deference, to the subject position—
the sovereign subject position even—before this text where the synoptic reading of the results of this 
systematically graphocentric truth game can finally take place. 
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orders he signed day by day and in the margin the sources of the funds (les fonds) covering 
the costs. This Journal is presented at the first Council meeting of the next month, so that ‘his 
‘his Majesty has this Register reported to him, has all the entries checked that he has in recent 
recent memory, and has made the calculations in his presence and (under?) the decree 
(arreste) of his hand’. (...sa Majesté se fait rapporter ce registre, et fait tirer toutes les 
dépenses dont elle a la mémoire récente, en fait faire le calcul dans sa présence et l’arreste 
l’arreste de sa main).  
Second (44-45), there is the Register of Funds (Régistre des Fonds), which has for each 
Fund all the receipts of the state which are written on the verso page, and on the recto page all 
the ‘conformation’ (toute la conformation) which is to say all payments made to the 
Espargne/Exchequer or the expenses (dépenses) assigned to this Fund. Again there is a 
signing-off ritual. ‘And from time to time (de temps en temps) [i.e. not specified as monthly] 
his Majesty, on the opening of the Register, verifies the Funds and the conformation, and he 
has them calculated (laquelle il fait calculer) under the decree of his hand (et l’arreste de sa 
main).42  
Third, there is (45) the Register of Expenses (Régistre des Dépenses), where are recorded 
all the expenses of the state and in the margin are the funds (fonds) to which they are 
assigned. And again ‘from time to time’ (de temps en temps) his Majesty on the opening of 
the register verifies some type of expenses, such as the extraordinary expenses of war, the 
Royal palaces (building expenses and others), sees all the funds on which these are drawn 
(tirées), and (much the same wording as in the Register of Funds) ‘has them calculated in his 
presence and under the decree of his hand’ (‘les fait calculer dans sa presence et les arreste 
de sa main’).  
Finally, the interrelation of the books is summarised: ‘these three registers each contain 
what all three contain, and so can easily be reconciled one by another’ (45). The description 
of the process of forensic audit is concluded, as Soll notes, with Colbert claiming that ‘by this 
clear and easy method [of working through the three books] His Majesty has… reduced his 
reliance on those who have the honour to serve him in this function’.  
 
  
                                                 
42 We add italics in the translation for emphasis here since Soll’s translation is ‘His Majesty verifies the Funds 
and confirmation, which he calculates and signs with his hand’ (2009, 62): but the formula in the French is the 
same, ‘fait calculer’ as is the case with the process for the third Register, where Soll goes with ‘has them 
calculated’ (2009, 63), this time correctly in our view. 
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